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ABSTRACT 
 
To be, or not to be——Statehood is the Question: Analyzing the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq 
 
 
 On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi officially declared the Islamic State in 
the Sham (ISIS) as an Islamic Caliphate, and consequently renamed his organization the 
Islamic State (IS). Over the course of 2014, the IS rose to garner significant international 
attention, which heightened following direct US military intervention in August 2014 in 
the form of airstrikes against the IS’s targets located in Iraq. Determining if the IS 
qualifies as a state, from a US perspective, holds significant ramifications for future 
military and diplomatic interactions with this organization. This analysis brings to light 
the ongoing issues with appropriately and objectively defining “statehood.” Additionally, 
it demonstrates shortcomings in US military doctrine on fighting state and non-state 
actors on both strategic and tactical levels. Examining the IS’s political, military and 
economic activities from October 2006 to August 2014 serves the dual purpose of 
evaluating how “closely” the IS resembles a state and, determining its potential for 
becoming a state in the future.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, western media and United States policy makers recognize the extremist 
militant organization currently known as the Islamic State as one of the most dangerous 
militant organizations in the Middle East. An offshoot of Al Qaeda, the IS may in fact be 
more dangerous and extreme than Al Qaeda, according to certain news sources.1 Media 
coverage in the wake of the IS’s summer 2014 advance through Iraq toward Baghdad 
focused on how the organization seems to have emerged out of “nowhere” and how it 
resembles a state.2 In the midst of the IS’s Iraq campaign, the IS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi announced on June 29, 2014 that the organization’s ultimate goal in Iraq and 
Syria is to establish an Islamic Caliphate. Historically, a Caliphate is an Islamic political, 
economic and social entity that functions like a state.  In this Islamic “state,” al-Baghdadi 
serves as the self-declared Caliph.3 Further media focus has been paid to the IS’s 
relatively successful military-style tactics, and consequently, its recent territorial gains. 
Notably, these successes have included the capture of Mosul and consequently the Mosul 
dam, in June 2014,4 as well as the capture of the Baiji oil refinery.5 The IS’s threat in 
Northern Iraq ultimately prompted the US to begin conducting airstrikes against the IS on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CBS News, “Why ISIS is more dangerous than al Qaeda,” 9 August 2014, accessed 15 September 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/why-isis-is-more-dangerous-than-al-qaeda/. 
2Faysal Itani, “We must treat ISIS like a state to defeat it,” TIME, 14 August 2014, accessed 15 September 
2014 http://time.com/3111276/isis-terror-iraq-treat-it-like-a-state/.  
3 Al Jazeera,  “Sunni rebels declare new ‘Islamic Caliphate,’” 30 June 2014, accessed 15 September 
2014http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic-caliphate-
201462917326669749.html. 
4Liz Sly, “Insurgents seize Iraqi city of Mosul as security forces flee,” 10 June 2014, accessed 15 
September 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-as-troops-
flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html. 
5 BBC News, “Iraq crisis: Key oil refinery ‘seized by rebels,’” 24 June 2014, accessed 15 September 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27990478.  
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August 8, 2014 to protect US personnel in Erbil, Iraq.6 The IS’s ability to fairly 
successfully implement government-like institutions in the territory it controls (such as 
providing public services, including water) differs from many other militant 
organizations operating in the Middle East, notably Al Qaeda, as well as the more secular 
rebel groups operating inside Syria.7 The IS’s brutal and violent tactics against both its 
opposition and the residents inside its territory attracts media attention, in addition to 
creating a refugee crisis as Iraqis and other religious minorities in the IS controlled 
territory flee their homes. The combination of the IS’s ability to capture and maintain 
territory through decisive military means and its willingness to use violence and brutal 
tactics demonstrates it has developed into a capable military, if not political, entity.  
This thesis examines the research question, “is the Islamic State transitioning 
from an extremist militant organization to a state?” Inherent in understanding if the IS is 
currently making this transition, has already made this transition, or will likely make this 
transition in the future, is determining what defines “statehood.” Multiple theories of 
statehood exist, but can generally be divided into de jure and de facto sovereignty.  Since 
de jure sovereignty requires outside state recognition of the aspiring state, and at the time 
of this thesis no states have recognized the IS as legitimate state, de facto sovereignty 
provides a better means in which to examine the IS. However, de facto sovereignty also 
falls short of adequately characterizing the practical ability of states and non-state actors 
to maintain effective control over their territory. For this reason, this thesis introduces the 
concept of three classes of “Hybrid State Entities” in an attempt to more accurately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Guardian, “US Military ISIS air strikes in Iraq: day-by-day breakdown,” accessed 15 September 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/aug/27/us-military-isis-air-strikes-in-iraq-day-by-
day-breakdown..  
7Jeremy Bender, “ISIS is turning food and water into a weapon in Iraq,” 15 August 2014, Business Insider, 
accessed 15 September 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-has-two-major-weapons-in-iraq-2014-8. 	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characterize modern non-state actors and successfully convey their ability to function in 
many respects, like recognized sovereign states. If the IS is practically functioning as a 
state, rather than a non-state actor, theoretically this conclusion would have significant 
ramifications on how the west, and specifically the US, interacts with the IS both now 
and in the future. 
 
Determining if the IS has an effective governing structure is important in concluding if it 
qualifies as a Hybrid State Entity or, more generally, as a de facto state. An effective 
governing structure demonstrates that functionally, the IS is able to successfully 
implement decisions and policies within its territory. Indicators of an effective governing 
 
Figure 1: Map of the IS's administrative divisions in Syria and Iraq 
Source: Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State.” November 2014.	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structure include the presence of effective political, military and economic capacities. 
Evidence supporting the presence of a political capacity would include evaluating the 
level of organization of the political structure, the power the political structure has to 
implement decisions, and the legitimacy of the political structure in the eyes of the 
population. Indicators of an effective military capacity focus on the ability to control a 
defined territory and population. This would be demonstrated by the presence of 
adaptable, modern and successful tactics, as well as a high level of integration between 
the military apparatus and political system in achieving mutual goals and leadership 
command. Autonomous political and military capabilities can prove difficult to merge 
into a single, cohesive entity willing to work in unison for a single goal, or under a single 
set of leadership. Finally, a state’s economic capabilities must adequately fund the state 
and its activities. Furthermore, examining the feasibility of economic capabilities to 
continue funding in the future is important to determining the longevity of the state. 
Ultimately, determining the most accurate way to characterize the IS depends on 
its ability to operate as a functional state on a day-to-day basis, as the second half of its 
moniker seems to suggest. Additionally, establishing how to best characterize state and 
non-state actors to most accurately reflect the nature of modern political entities becomes 
paramount, not only to the research covered in this thesis, but also practically in current 
and future state interactions with other political entities.  
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
1.1 Terminology 
 
Throughout this thesis, the organization currently known as the Islamic State will be 
referred to by several different names. These names reflect the IS’s official names over 
various time periods. Each of these names, and their respective acronyms, will be used to 
describe the IS in the specific time period in which it existed. Below is list of these time 
periods and organization titles: 
• Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn,   pre-October 2006 
Al Qaeda in Iraq        
• al-Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya,     October 2006-April 
2013 
the Islamic State in Iraq     
• al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham,    April 2013-June 2014 
Islamic State in the Sham       
• Dawlat al-Islamiyya, the Islamic State    June 2014-present 
 
Furthermore, this thesis will refer to the IS as an “extremist militant organization” rather 
than a terrorist organization. Defining terrorist organizations is very contentious, as a 
variety of definitions exist, depending on individual nations, groups, organizations, states, 
and with regards specifically to the US, the particular agency or department (the State 
Department and Department of Defense, for example, ascribe to slightly different 
definitions of terrorist organization).8 In order to objectively examine the IS and its 
activities, avoiding confusing or misleading definitions is necessary. The term “extremist 
militant organization” attempts to convey the extremist nature of the IS’s ideology, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Leonard Weinburg, Ami Pedahzur, and  Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing 
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 16 (2004). 777.  
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well as its militant nature as an armed organization, willing and capable of using violence 
to achieve its goals. 
1.2 Origins of the Islamic State 
 
In October 2006, the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Ayub al-Masri, 
formally changed the name of his organization to al-Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya, or the 
Islamic State in Iraq. This name change, coupled with al-Masri’s designation of Iraqi 
national Abdullah Rishad al-Baghdadi9 as the new leader of the ISI, marks a significant 
change in the history of the organization today known as the Islamic State. Both prior to 
and after the ISI’s 2006 name change, the organization represented Al Qaeda’s official 
affiliate in Iraq. Generally active in the western regions of Iraq, the ISI primarily operated 
by conducting IED and VBIED attacks against coalition forces.10 Additionally, AQI 
targeted many Shiite holy sites; most famously, AQI is known for the bombing of the 
Askariyah Shrine in Samarra, Iraq in February 2006.11 Although the ISI remained 
associated with Al Qaeda following its October rebranding, I argue, this name change 
marks the beginning of the ISI departure from both Al Qaeda leadership and overarching 
Al Qaeda goals for Iraq. This change ultimately resulted in Al Qaeda retracting its 
affiliation with the ISI in early 2014, the ISI’s second rebranding to the Islamic State in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Joseph Felter, and Brian Fishman, "Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar records," 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 December 2007, accessed 3 September 2-14, 
http:/ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.  
10 The New York Times,“Attacks that could be contributed to ISIS,” 15 June 2014, accessed 1 September 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-
photos-and-video.html?_r=0.  
11 Rober F. Worth, “Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq,” The New York Times, 23 
February 2006, accessed 3 September 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/world/23iraq.html?pagewanted=all.  
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the Sham and ISIS’s June 2014 declaration of its goal to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 
Syria and Iraq, as well as its most recent title change to the Islamic State.12 
AQI’s 2006 name change to the ISI was important for two main reasons. First and 
foremost, al-Baghdadi desired to increase popular support for his organization. 
Previously AQI had alienated much of the local Iraqi population due to the severity of its 
attacks, especially its indiscriminate targeting of Shiite civilians in attacks. Al Qaeda’s 
disdain for such tactics was demonstrated in Ayman al-Zawahiri’s, the second in 
command of Al Qaeda, letter to AQI leadership in 2005. Al-Zawahiri scolded the 
targeting of civilians, both Shiite and Sunni.13 Al Qaeda leadership’s continued lack of 
support for the ISI’s violent tactics demonstrated a fundamental difference in tactics 
between the two organizations that continued to cause disagreements in the future. The 
second aspect of the ISI’s rebranding was to create increased focus on the ISI’s state 
building aspirations and solidify its presence as a more permanent, governing force in 
Iraq. According to the Washington Post, by the end of 2006, the majority of the ISI 
members were of Iraqi origin, as compared to previous years, where the ISI consisted of 
primarily of foreign fighters.14 This trend of using foreign fighters persists in the IS’s 
operations to the present day. The majority of foreign fighters employed by the IS are not 
indigenous to the IS’s territory in Iraq or Syria. This suggests that these fighters are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Zack Beauchamp, “17 things about ISIS and Iraq you need to know,” Vox, 18 September 2014, accessed 
21 September 2014, http://www.vox.com/cards/things-about-isis-you-need-to-know/what-is-isis.  
Ben Hubbard, “Al Qaeda breaks with Jihadist group in Syria involved in rebel infighting,” The New York 
Times, 3 February 2014, accessed 29 August 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0. 
Matt Bradley, “ISIS declares new Islamic Caliphate,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2014, accessed 15 
September 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate-1404065263.  
13 The Weekly Standard. “English translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” 12 
October 2005, accessed 22 September 2014, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp. 
14 Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Washington Post, 9 November 2007, accessed 22 September 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/19/AR2007111900721.html.  
  15	  
fighting for personal gain, rather than a deep-seated commitment to establishing a viable 
state, for instance, and call into question how far into the future the IS can expect to rely 
on this force.  
At the beginning of 2007, the ISI continued to conduct numerous attacks, many of 
which targeted Iraqi Sunnis and other minorities in Iraq. This included a series of car 
bombs in August 2007 responsible for the deaths of 700 people in the Northern Yazidi 
regions of Iraq.15 The ISI’s attacks helped contribute to the Sunni Awakening, a 
movement that severely impacted the ISI’s abilities to conduct operations and attacks. 
Reacting to the ISI, Sunni groups throughout Iraq developed Awakening Councils, 
comprised of tribal and community leaders. These councils worked with US and 
Coalition forces to help find and destroy the ISI’s members and leadership.16 
Additionally, the 2007 surge of over 300,000 US forces helped to limit the ISI’s activity 
and severely impact their ability to effectively operate in Iraq.17 
The Sunni Awakening and Coalition forces’ initiatives severely impacted the ISI 
as an organization. The number of attacks conducted by the ISI dramatically fell, as the 
ISI’s leadership was killed, and the ISI’s members were driven from their traditional 
strongholds.18 Coalition forces accomplished this in large part through working with 
“Sahwa” tribal Iraqi security forces to find and destroy the ISI’s leadership. For example, 
Operation Phoenix, beginning in January 2008, specifically targeted the ISI’s remaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
16 BBC News, “Q&A: Iraq’s Awakening Councils,” 18 July 2010, accessed 26 September 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10677623/.  
17 Council on Foreign Relations, “Backgrounders,” accessed 26 September 2014,	  
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811.  
18 Myriam. Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal “Sahwa”: Its rise and fall,” Middle East Policy Council, Spring 2011, 
accessed 26 September 2014, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-
its-rise-and-fall?print.  
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leadership, and resulted in the capture and death of 92 high-value ISI targets in Iraq.19 
Furthermore, the organization from 2007-2008 was expelled from its traditional 
strongholds in Anbar province and forced to relocate to Diyala, Salah al-Din, and finally 
Mosul.20 The period from 2007 to 2008 represented a low point for the ISI, as the ISI’s 
remaining leadership struggled to maintain operations and the ISI’s organizational 
structure. 
The ISI remained fairly inactive until the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 
2011. From 2009-2011, the New York Times estimates the ISI conducted a total of 198 
attacks in Iraq, in comparison to a total of 603 attacks in 2012 alone.21 On April 18, 2010, 
the ISI’s leader, Abdullah Rishad al-Baghdadi, was killed in an US Airstrike.22 
Consequently, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed control as the new leader of the ISI.23 Al-
Baghdadi began to place increased focus on Shiite targets, in addition to attacking local 
Iraqi military and police offices and checkpoints.24 Furthermore, during this time period, 
the ISI acquired new fighters in its ranks from the former Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq 
were groups of Sunni fighters that fought against the AQI and ISI during the Sunni 
Awakening in the Iraq War. However, failure on behalf of the newly instituted Iraqi 
government, headed by Prime Minister Maliki, to fully integrate the Sons of Iraq into 	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24 Bobby Ghosh, “ISIS: A Short History,” The Atlantic, 14 August 2014, accessed 26 September 2014, 
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military and police forces resulted in distrust and resentment toward the newly 
established Iraqi government.25 Many former Sons of Iraq members consisted of former 
soldiers and officers from Saddam’s military, and thus provided considerable military 
expertise and experience to the ISI. 
This link between former Iraqi Ba’athists, who worked under Saddam Hussein 
and adhered to a largely secular religious ideology, and the IS continues to present day. 
Many high-ranking	  members of the IS are former Ba’athists, and provide considerable 
military, political and administrative experience for IS. According to David Kilcullen, an 
expert on modern insurgencies and guerilla organizations, one of AQI’s predominate 
shortcomings was its lack of administrative operations,  
AQI cells were thus cruelly capable at the coercive end of the spectrum, 
but almost totally lacking in administrative and persuasive capabilities. 
AQI attempted nothing like formal governance, nor did it ever even try 
to provide any significant administrative services—it gave no tangible 
benefits to its supporters or provided no essential support or 
humanitarian assistance to the Sunni population.26    
The organization appears to have remedied this problem during its recent resurgence. The 
US in part provided the opportunity for the IS’s leadership to acquire the skills provided 
by Ba’athists. During the Iraq war, the US military imprisoned many leaders of AQI, as 
well as former high-level officials who worked under Saddam Hussein. Several of these 
individuals found themselves at the same US military prison camps. For example, Abu 
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Bakr al-Baghdadi, the future leader of the IS and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a former Lt. 
Col of military intelligence under Saddam Hussein were both detained at Camp Bucca in 
Iraq.27  
 The integration of former Ba’athists into the IS’s ranks demonstrates that the IS is 
not simply a religious organization, intent on achieving it’s goals of creating a Caliphate. 
It also is pragmatic, recognizing that maintaining successful governance over a territory 
and a population requires staff and officials who are experienced in performing 
bureaucratic and administrative tasks. Furthermore, it appears as if in some respects the 
IS is willing to compromise its religious doctrine in order to gain the experience and 
expertise of secular counterparts. Even though militant extremists and secular Ba’athists 
may seem strange bedfellows, their cooperation reveals that the IS is a multifaceted and 
complex organization, which is willing to reconcile, to some degree, religious differences 
in order to appeal to Ba’athists and pursue a larger goal of effective governance. By 
demonstrating that it is willing to compromise its staunch religious leanings with 
practically administering its territory, the IS proves it understands the necessity of 
creating and maintaining a functional state in order to achieve its religious goal of 
creating an Islamic Caliphate.  
The ISI began expanding from Iraq into Northern Syria during January 2013, 
eventually capturing the town of Raqqa in March 201328 and Azaz in September 2013.29 
The ISI continued to push westward towards Aleppo, fighting both Assad regime forces 
and rebel groups. On April 8, 2013, the ISI once again changed its name to the Islamic 	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State in the Sham, sometimes translated to the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant.30 
The Arabic term “Sham” refers to an area of land that consists of modern-day Syria, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and a part of southwestern Turkey.31 
This name change reflects the expansion of the organization’s activities into Syria. 
During this time, ISIS also continued its activities in Iraq. ISIS’s “Breaking Walls 
Campaign” began in July 2012 and consisted of a yearlong series of severe IED and 
VBIED attacks in Northern and Eastern Iraq.32 Additionally, ISIS conducted eight prison 
breaks during this campaign. The “Breaking Walls Campaign” in Iraq ended in July 2013 
with the ISIS breach of Abu Ghraib prison, resulting in the escape of over 500 prisoners. 
Many of these prisoners joined ISIS, further boosting the organization’s fighting 
capacity.33  
ISIS’s independence was confirmed when it officially split with Al Qaeda central 
leadership in 2014.34 Al-Baghdadi’s disagreements with Al Qaeda began when al-
Baghdadi claimed in April 2013 that ISIS had been previously fighting in Syria, through 
the al-Nusra front. Up to this point, al-Nusra had been Al Qaeda’s affiliate arm in Syria, 
and was subordinate to general Al Qaeda leadership. However, the leader of al-Nusra, 
Muhammad al-Jawlani, disagreed with al-Baghdadi and pledged allegiance to al-
Zawahiri. In response to this disagreement, al-Zawahiri sent a private message to ISIS 
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and al-Nusra leadership stating that ISIS was to limit its operations in Iraq, change its 
name, and that al-Nusra was the official Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, subject only to Al 
Qaeda central leadership.35 Al-Bahgdadi ultimately rejected al-Zawahiri’s decree and 
continued ISIS operations in Syria. Officially, Al Qaeda renounced affiliation with ISIS 
in April 2014. This split additionally marked an important shift in how the west viewed 
Al-Qaeda and the IS. At the time, this split was viewed as a potential sign that under al-
Zawahiri’s leadership, Al Qaeda was becoming weaker, as it was no longer able to exert 
control over its regional branches. ISIS was still largely viewed in the context as an 
extremist rebel group operating in the Syrian Civil War. 
  At the end of 2013, ISIS maintained strongholds in several Northern Syrian towns 
including the provincial capital of Raqqa. Reports indicated that ISIS had started to 
establish public services in these cities, such as an education system, police force and 
religious courts.36 Moving forward from its success in Northern Syria, ISIS launched an 
offensive back into Iraq on 30 December 2013 capturing the town of Fallujah on 3 
January 2014. 37 ISIS’s offensive continued in June 2014, when the militant organization 
conducted a campaign driving further into Iraq, following the Tigris River toward 
Baghdad. Notably, from 10-13 June, ISIS was able to successfully gain control of 
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numerous cities, including Mosul, Baiji, Tikrit, Samarra, and Jalawla.38 After being 
pushed back by Iraqi government and Kurdish forces, IS continued to move south, taking 
Ishki and Dujali on 14 June.39 ISIS’s advance was stopped on the outskirts of Baghdad by 
the Iraqi army, assisted by Iranian Qouds force fighters.40 ISIS’s summer expansion from 
1 June to 6 August in Iraq resulted in over one million people fleeing their homes.41  In 
the midst of ISIS’s Iraq campaign, al-Baghdadi announced on 29 June ISIS’s ultimate 
goal in Iraq and Syria: to establish an Islamic Caliphate, with al-Baghdadi as Caliph. This 
declaration also prompted a name change for the organization, ISIS would from that point 
on, be known simply as the Islamic State.42 
With the IS encroachment in Erbil in late July and early August 2014, the US 
began conducting airstrikes against the IS’s targets on 8 August 2014. President Obama 
stated that his reasoning for beginning the attacks on 8 August, rather than earlier in the 
IS’s campaign, was primarily due to concerns over the security of US consulate workers 
in Erbil, “in recent days, these terrorists have continued to move across Iraq, and have 
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neared the city of Erbil, where American diplomats and civilians serve at our consulate 
and American military personnel advise Iraqi forces.”43  
US military involvement against the IS marks a definitive point in the history of 
the IS. By declaring it would use airstrikes to protect its assets, the US acknowledged that 
the IS posed a strategic and realistic threat. By conducting airstrikes against specific IS 
targets, the US inadvertently acknowledged that by 8 August 2014, the IS was a capable 
and dangerous militant organization operating in Iraq and Syria, that was achieving its 
goals of territorial acquisition.  
In summary, whether the IS’s activity up to the US airstrikes on 8 August 2014 
represents the pinnacle of the IS’s power in Iraq remains to be seen; however, the change 
which the organization underwent from 2006 to 2014 provides a wide-ranging scope in 
which to examine both the IS’s evolution in capabilities and state-building potential. It is 
undeniable that the IS has made a great transition from the militant organization 
weakened in the aftermath of the Sunni Awakening to one of the most successful militant 
organizations in the Middle East, able to dually acquire territory and conduct threatening 
attacks. Ultimately, the IS appears to be operating in a different manner than its militant 
counterparts in Iraq and Syria, as it makes considerable effort to begin instituting several 
state-like governing institutions in its territories, such as establishing key infrastructure, 
water, agricultural systems, and oil refineries.44 These natural resources allow the IS to 
further control its population, as the state first and foremost controls basic necessities, 
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like food and water, required by the population. The population thus becomes dependent 
on the IS for survival. 
1.3 Creating the ‘Caliphate’ 
After breaking from Al Qaeda, the IS began campaigns to acquire territory in 
Syria and Iraq, maintaining its ultimate goal is to create an Islamic Caliphate, akin to the 
Caliphates under the Muslim Imams in the 2nd century. In such a Caliphate, Islamic 
Sharia law is the ultimate law of the land, with severe repercussions for those who break 
those laws.45 The IS seeks to create an Islamic Sunni state, but is willing to target Sunni 
residents who do not abide by Sharia law. As the current head of the IS, al-Baghdadi 
serves as a self-declared Caliph in the IS Caliphate. Additionally, the IS appears to be 
targeting religious minorities in the region that do not subscribe to Sunni Islam, such as 
Yazidis and Christians.46 The predominant religious and ideological differences between 
the IS and its respective Islamic extremist militant counterparts, such as Al Qaeda, 
largely lie in the tactics the IS employs and its ultimate goal of establishing the “one true” 
Islamic Caliphate.  
Historically, the term “Caliphate” refers to the Islamic institution that was 
established following the emergence of Islam as a religion in seventh-century Arabia. 
After the death of Mohammad in 632 AD, the Islamic religious community was in need 
of leadership. The first four Caliphs, or leaders of the Caliphate, were selected from 
among Mohammad’s close followers. A split in the Islamic community occurred when 
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one faction insisted that the Caliphs should follow Mohammad’s bloodline through his 
cousin Ali, rather than his disciples.47 This split created the Shiite faction, whose 
followers believe that the Caliphs should follow Mohammad’s bloodline. The IS 
perpetrates a highly romanticized portrait of the Caliphate that focuses not only on 
creating an ideal form of governance, but also a Sunni Muslim Community that is 
monolithic and united.48 Furthermore, the IS bases its interpretation of a Caliphate on a 
largely inaccurate historical depiction of the Caliphates that, according to Furlow, 
Fleischer and Corman, professors of strategic communication, “portray[s] the Caliphate 
as a glorious, shining kingdom on a hill, while editing out inconvenient historical details 
about the infighting, assassination, civil war, and territorial losses that plagued the 
Caliphates.”49 
Caliphates were entities that incorporated both Islam and governance. The ruler of 
this institution provided the overarching leadership to both religious and political aspects 
of this state-like entity. For example, during the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1299 to 
1924, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph served as the dual head of government and Islamic 
community. Conveniently, the IS shies away from discussing the internal issues that 
plagued Caliphates, and instead focuses on how the West contributed to the downfall of 
the Caliphate. For example, the IS argues that the downfall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 
1924 lead to Muslim subjugation by western colonial powers, but ignores the difficulties 
the Ottoman Empire faced economically in the century leading up to Atatürk’s creation 
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of the Republic of Turkey in 1924. Even though the IS focuses on the largely religious 
nature of Caliphates and their successes, it should also be noted that the numerous issues 
Caliphates faced are the same as those faced by nation-states and political institutions. 
The Caliph and his Caliphate had to dually incorporate pragmatic aspects of governance, 
such as a viable economic system, and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of its 
population, as well as religious aspects of governance, in order to maintain a functional 
governing entity.  
From a religious point of view, creating an all-encompassing Islamic Caliphate, 
according to Dr. Carool Kersten of King’s College London’s Theology and Religious 
Studies Department, is “rather grandiose and utopian.”50 Ultimately, the IS’s version of 
the Caliphate ignores the historical diversities in nationality and ethnicity among 
Muslims in favor of promoting a unified and all-encompassing religious and political 
governing entity.51 This seems like an overly optimistic way in which to create a 
functional governing entity, as erasing these differences could prove extremely difficult. 
However, from a practical and pragmatic point of view, declaring a Caliphate allows the 
IS to give legitimacy to its territorial acquisitions. Since the IS’s territory is carved from 
that of existing territory from the recognized nation-states of Iraq and Syria, it must prove 
that the institution it is creating is on par with those of states. The Caliphate provides this 
alternative.  
In creating a Caliphate, the IS is attempting to achieve two main goals. Its first 
objective is to establish Islamic governance through Sharia law. The IS ascribes to Sunni 
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Wahabism and the Islamic concept of Takfir.52 The IS uses Wahhabi ideology to explain 
its use of violent tactics to “purify” Muslim societies that have become sinful.53 Takfir is 
a specific doctrine that allows Muslims to declare fellow Muslims as infidels if they fail 
to adhere to specific tenets of Islam, and therefore, become legitimate targets for Jihad. In 
this way, the IS proves it has a desire to govern a population according to a specific 
political doctrine, and likewise implement social change to accomplish this. Secondarily, 
the IS attempts to build legitimacy in the eyes of its population by implementing various 
social projects in its territory. It becomes evident through the IS’s actions that the 
organization wants to be a functional governing authority, and is going to great lengths to 
achieve this goal. In the practical sense, a Caliphate, like a modern state, seeks to 
effectively govern a specific population living in a specific territory. Additional analysis 
of what constitutes a modern state will be provided in Chapter 2. The IS is in comparison 
to other extremist militant organizations, such as Hezbollah, which is often touted as a 
“state within a state,”54 yet does not claim statehood. The IS’s outward claims to 
establishing a Caliphate, do generally, extend to the entire Muslim world;55 however, in 
the immediate term, the IS seems mainly concerned with gaining and maintaining its 
territory in Syria and Iraq. This plan is corroborated by the simple fact that the IS’s 
complex efforts in building effective governance are applied to its current territory. So 	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far, similar efforts at creating and enforcing governance are not being applied to 
expansions of territory outside of Syria and Iraq, such as in North Africa, for instance.   
Furthermore, a Caliphate harnesses legitimacy through an Islamic discourse, 
allowing the IS to circumvent establishing its legitimacy as a “state,” as defined by 
international law. Even though in a practical sense, a Caliphate embodies many of the 
same characteristics as a modern nation-state, it remains separate because it ascribes to 
the pursuit of creating an all-encompassing Islamic identity. Because of this, establishing 
legitimacy as a functional governing authority only does not entail establishing 
legitimacy as a modern state, as defined by international law, and ascribed to by the 
current international community, which consists of states, and non-state actors. Given its 
commitment to violence and lack of regard for upholding general human rights, it is 
highly unlikely that the IS desires membership among recognized states in the UN, for 
example. However, it still desires governance, and the creation of an institution that 
practically resembles a state. Even though the IS appeals to a strictly religious discourse, 
rather than the secular discourse of international law, does this make it any less state-
like? The IS’s state-building aspirations should not be discounted simply because it 
refuses to ascribe to popular notions of statehood. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the way 
in which the IS acts as an effective governing authority, that is, outside of usual 
conceptions of what constitutes modern states, is not adequately described by existing 
definitions of states and non-state actors.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Determining how to best evaluate the components of a modern state requires 
analysis of multiple definitions on how a state forms, the characteristics of a modern 
state, and how a state retains its statehood. Specific focus will be paid to de facto 
definitions of sovereignty because the IS is not currently recognized by any sovereign 
states officially as a state, and it seems rather unlikely that official recognition of the IS 
sovereignty will occur in the near future. Therefore, evaluating the IS on de jure criteria 
will not produce adequate insight into truly understating the IS’s capacity to exist and 
function as a state. This thesis proposes the use of three distinct classes of Hybrid State 
Entities (HSEs) as a means to adequately define and characterize modern state and non-
state actors. Generally, sovereignty, although a broad concept, entails legitimate 
authority, “authority is ‘the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed,’ 
and it is legitimate when it is seen as right by those living under it.”56 Sovereign entities 
must therefore possess some kind of authority, and through this exhibition of authority, 
the sovereign entity gains legitimacy.57 
2.1 Defining Sovereignty  
Numerous discrepancies exist as to which entity is responsible for determining the 
ultimate sovereignty of the state, be it the international community of existing states, or 
self-determinism of the aspiring state itself.  Steven Krasner, a professor of international 	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relations at Stanford University and former director of Policy Planning at the US State 
Department, outlines the different spheres of sovereignty that exist: international legal 
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence 
sovereignty. International legal sovereignty “refers to the practices associated with 
mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical 
interdependence,”58 and is thus associated with the concept that entities must meet a 
specific legal definition in order to be considered “sovereign.” An example of this is 
simply the recognition afforded to member states of the United Nations. Westphalian 
sovereignty also entails meeting specific criteria, as sovereign entities must be 
responsible for their own actions through the creation of a political structure, 
“Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of 
external actors from authority structures within a given territory.”59 This type of 
sovereignty therefore requires a political structure responsible for maintaining authority 
in its territory, without the influence of outside actors or states. In reality, this entails non-
intervention from other states. The final two types of sovereignty Krasner discusses relate 
to an entity’s ability to establish authority within their territory. Domestic sovereignty 
“refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of 
public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.”60  
Essentially, sovereign entities must be able to control what happens within their 
defined borders. Internal governance can occur under many different types of 
governance; for instance, in some states, a presidency is the means of governance, while 
in others, it is a dictatorship. Sovereign entities must also, under the auspices of 	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interdependence sovereignty, “regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, 
pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.”61 Similar to Westphalian 
sovereignty in the sense that a state must maintain authority of its territory, 
interdependence sovereignty establishes the idea that a state must take responsibility for 
what crosses its borders. Krasner explains this form of sovereignty using the example of 
the effects of globalization on states, “when people say globalization is eroding 
sovereignty, what they mean is you can't control capital flows, you can't control 
migration, you can't control ideas.”62 The combination of these categories of sovereignty 
demonstrates the presence of numerous definitions of sovereignty, as well as criteria in 
which to evaluate a states’ possession, or lack thereof, of sovereignty. However, these 
four definitions do highlight the reoccurring themes of territorial control and independent 
governing structure in determining an entity’s sovereignty. In regards to analyzing the 
IS’s potential statehood, Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty will 
likely be the most pertinent. The combination of these theories of sovereignty strongly 
correlates to establishing effective governance over a specific population in a designated 
territory. International legal sovereignty, however, pertains largely to meeting specific 
criteria on statehood, and being recognized as a state, which the IS will undoubtedly fail 
to accomplish.  
2.2 State Actions 
 In addition to characterizing states based on their spheres of sovereignty, states 
may also be defined according to what actions they conduct. The sociologist, political 
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scientist and historian Charles Tilly outlines four different activities that states must 
undertake: war making, state making, “protection,” and “extraction.”63 States must be 
able to wage war, which constitutes eliminating or neutralizing rivals outside a state’s 
territory. “State making” is also necessary, where entities must eliminate or neutralizes 
rivals inside their territory in order to retain a monopoly on authority. Protection involves 
eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of state clients. These “clients” are essentially the 
enemies of a state’s residents and allies to the state. The final action states must undertake 
entails “acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities-war making, state 
making and protection” which Tilly defines as “extraction.” 64 Much like Krasner’s 
different types of sovereignty, Tilly’s description of state actions also focuses on the 
importance of establishing authority both inside and outside state territory.  
2.3 de jure and de facto sovereignty  
As evidenced by both Krasner and Tilly, there are countless ways to define and 
determine what actions or criteria might be needed to successfully characterize a state as 
sovereign, possessing authority, and maintaining legitimacy, both inside and outside its 
borders. Furthermore, the question arises of exactly how many or how few of these 
attributes an aspiring state must meet in order to be considered a state. Determining a 
means by which to characterize state activities is necessary in order to best understand the 
components of sovereignty. The two categories that can be effectively used to group 
sovereign state characteristics include de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty. De 
jure sovereignty refers to an entity being sovereign based on a legal set of criteria, as 
exemplified in Krasner’s definitions of Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. 	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Conversely, de facto sovereignty encompasses an entity’s actions that demonstrate it is a 
state in practice, but not necessarily a state as defined by legal criteria. Rather than 
including a specific number of designated criteria (such as the four criteria outlined by 
Krasner and Tilly), the categories of de jure and de facto sovereignty can include a 
broader range of activities and evidence that provides proof an entity exists as a sovereign 
state. 
De jure sovereignty requires specific legal criteria in which to evaluate if an entity 
meets qualifications for statehood. The generally approved source for these criteria is the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. This treaty was 
signed by 19 states during the International Conference of American States in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, and went into effect in December 1934. The criteria established in 
the Montevideo Convention were further established as legitimate means to determine 
statehood, in the realm of international law, through their registration in the League of 
Nations Treaty Series in January 1936.65 According to the Montevideo Convention, 
“states as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) 
permanent population (b) defined territory (c) government and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states.”66 These four criteria provide general direction on what, 
according to the international community, constitutes a sovereign state.  
Even though the criteria established by the Montevideo Convention appear fairly 
explicit in their meaning, significant debate exists on who, or what, actually determines if 
an aspiring state meets the legal definitions for statehood. This debate revolves around 
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the importance of recognizing a state as meeting the criteria.67 The two competing 
theories regarding recognition are the constitutive and declaratory theories.  
Essentially, these competing views attempt to determine “whether recognition by 
other states is ‘constitutive’ of the existence of a legal entity or merely ‘declaratory’ of its 
existence.”68 The constitutive theory therefore states that in addition to these four criteria, 
aspiring states need to gain recognition from other previously existing sovereign states.69 
Recognition of the state can be demonstrated by admitting an aspiring state to an 
international organization; for example, Ethiopia was recognized as a state through its 
admittance to the League of Nations in 1923. Conversely, the declaratory theory 
postulates that entities only need to possess the four criteria outlined in the Montevideo 
Convention in order to become a state. Brad R. Roth, a professor of political science, 
maintains that the main strength of the declaratory theory is “its denial to states of the 
rights to determine, even collectively, the legal status of an entity according to their own 
political convenience” and thus attempts to provide an objective means of determining 
statehood.70 The territory of Transnistria in Moldova provides an example of the 
declaratory theory of statehood. Transnistria has remained independent since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and meets all four criteria provided by the Montevideo 
Convention, as it possesses a territory, permanent population, government and has 
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entered into relations with other states, namely Russia.71 Despite meeting these criteria, 
Transnistria remains a territory, rather than a state, due to a lack of recognition.  
However, the shortcomings of the declaratory theory rest in its disregard that very rarely, 
do aspiring states clearly and fully fill all criteria for statehood. Bridget Coggins, a 
political scientist, argues, “external politics, not only facts on the ground, determine state 
birth” and ultimately, “independence projects falter if they cannot secure external 
legitimacy.”72 Even if aspiring states do meet the declaratory theory’s qualifications for 
statehood, without outside recognition of sovereignty (and therefore, legitimacy), states 
are unlikely to be successful for sustained periods of time. It appears a combination of 
outside recognition and meeting the Montevideo Convention criteria is necessary for 
entities to be realistically defined as sovereign states. However, the degree of importance 
afforded to recognition versus meeting international legal criteria is still largely up to 
debate. 
The second method for determining statehood lies in de facto sovereignty, or the 
effective control an aspiring state holds over its territory. This method is more applicable 
to judging the IS’s statehood because it examines if an entity practically functions as a 
state. This is because de facto sovereignty pays credence to what the aspiring state is 
doing on the ground, inside and outside its own territory, and thus, largely relies on the 
reactions of the people living inside the governed territory to determine effectiveness of 
rule. The Republic of Somaliland provides an example of de facto statehood. Somaliland 
is a self-declared autonomous region of Somalia, but remains unrecognized by any 
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member of the United Nations.73 However, the Republic of Somaliland maintains de 
facto control over its territory; Somaliland has its own political system with executive, 
legislative and judicial branches, issues its own passports, and has maintained safety and 
stability inside its territory.74   
Residents’ reactions help determine if habitual obedience to the authority of the 
state exists.75 In reality, it seems very rare that sovereign states’ populations completely 
consent to being governed. Opposition factions almost always exist, yet many entities are 
still considered to be sovereign without the entire population’s full consent to being 
governed. The distinction if residents comply with a governing structure through fear of 
personal harm, coercion by the government, or in support of the ruling entity becomes 
irrelevant. The fact that residents are simply abiding by the authority of the ruling 
government with minimal protests or revolts demonstrates that, to a certain degree, a 
governing structure does hold effective control over its territory.  
2.4 Implications of Statehood on US Military Actions and Diplomacy 
Evaluating	  the IS through the de facto definition of state sovereignty provides the 
best means for determining if it is functionally a state. Functionality provides important 
implications for US policy makers, both in the political and military realms in how to best 
interact with the IS currently and in the future. How an entity is regarded by other 
sovereign states will determine the means in which a state chooses to interact with the 
entity. A sovereign state, may, for instance, resort to military solutions more quickly than 
diplomatic negotiations with an entity it does not consider it to be a sovereign state. 	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Furthermore, the military techniques a state may choose to use may change with 
recognition of sovereignty or lack thereof. If the IS functionally operates as a de facto 
state, understanding the multi-faceted ways in which the IS appears legitimate to its 
populations, as well as the governance it provides to the populations residing in its 
territory are integral to devising appropriate military and diplomatic strategies to combat 
the IS.  
Since this thesis will address the ramifications of the IS’s statehood in regards to 
the US, examining the way in which the US theoretically wages war is necessary to 
understanding the importance of determining the IS’s statehood. The United States’ 
military doctrine contains two predominant types of warfare, traditional warfare and 
irregular warfare. The doctrine for the US armed forces characterizes traditional warfare 
as “a violent struggle for domination between nation-state(s) or coalitions and alliances of 
nation-states,” with the strategic purpose of warfare being “the imposition of a nation’s 
will on its adversary nation-state(s) and the avoidance of its will being imposed on [it].”76 
Conversely, irregular warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations […] the strategic point 
of IW is to gain or maintain influence over, and the support of, a relevant population.”77 
As evidenced by these two distinct definitions, the US military takes different approaches 
to dealing with traditional and irregular warfare, “each [type of warfare] serves a 
fundamentally different strategic purpose that drives different approaches to its 
conduct.”78 The definitions of warfare are also tied to whether or not an entity is 
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characterized as a state, since traditionally, strong states are more willing to engage in 
traditional conventional warfare, while weak non-state actors are more likely to engage in 
irregular warfare. The US armed forces doctrine does realistically note that “warfare is a 
united whole, incorporating all its aspects together, traditional and irregular. It is, in fact, 
the creative, dynamic, and synergistic combination of both that is usually most 
effective.”79 These two distinct definitions on when to theoretically use each type of 
warfare demonstrates that the US military is pre-disposed to utilizing different military 
tactics depending on the sovereignty of the enemy. 
Furthermore, it is in the US’s best interest not to recognize the IS as a state. By 
subjectively choosing which non-state entities it recognizes as states, the US directly 
dictates how it is able to militarily and diplomatically engage these actors. States are 
afforded specific rights under the Geneva Convention, which non-state actors do not 
have.80 Since the US military must follow the Laws of War, it behooves the US to 
continue to term the IS as a non-state actor.  
 Also at play is the modern battlefield in which today, most military threats states 
face come from new dimensions other than traditional military threats from opposing 
sovereign states. These threats can include cyber warfare, transnational warfare and civil 
war. States today must determine “how to balance, prioritize, promote, and protect 
interests along several different dimensions (economic, environmental, etc.), while 
military security against a powerful, aggressive sovereign state enemy is more assured 
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than ever.”81  Since modern sovereign states, especially world powers like the US, 
generally do not face overt military threats, such as invasion by a foreign army, 
“resources, political will, and political consensus available for the fight are greatly 
reduced.”82 This influences a state’s willingness to recognize outside entities, since “it is 
hard for policymakers and the public to take seriously the threats which flow from weak 
states as opposed to strong states.”83 The US may therefore be less inclined to recognize a 
non-state actor, since policymakers view an entity without a strong conventional army 
(traditionally characteristic of states) as less of a threat. Such a line of thinking is 
problematic, however, as aspiring states may successfully utilize non-traditional warfare 
tactics that demonstrate effective control over military and territory. Recognition 
therefore becomes a dual question of political perceptions regarding the capabilities of a 
non-state actor, and the actual military actions the actor is able to produce.  
This line of thinking also has a bearing on the political and diplomatic realm. 
States, in recognizing an aspiring state as sovereign, would consequently establish 
official relations with the newly recognized state. In times of conflict between the 
recognizing state and the recognized state, treaties or bargaining may be pursued through 
official diplomatic channels. Both entities may thus be more pre-disposed to finding a 
peaceful solution through diplomatic means, rather than resort to military means to 
resolve the conflict.  However, when a state is not recognized as sovereign, existing 
sovereign states may be more willing to resort to military means over diplomatic means 
to arrive at a solution. States that are determined to be sovereign entertain greater 
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opportunity to engage in a variety of diplomatic and military interactions with other 
sovereign states, in comparison to non-state entities. Therefore, determining if an entity 
can actually be characterized as a state has significant ramifications on the future 
interactions with this entity and other international actors. 
2.5 Internal and External Actions  
Examining both the internal and external actions of a political entity to determine 
if it possesses state sovereignty is important in order to gain a comprehensive view of an 
entity’s legitimacy, both inside and outside its borders. As Roth describes, 
Legitimacy [...] arises as a question from two distinct perspectives: the 
internal and the external. On the one hand, ought the putative authority to be 
regarded as legitimate by those subject to it? On the other hand, ought the 
putative authority to be regarded as legitimate by outside entities?84 
The ‘internal’ category refers to an entity’s actions regarding the residents inside its 
territory, “internal sovereignty consists in the exercise of effective and independent 
government control, over a population, on a generally marked-out territory.”85 Whether 
or not an aspiring state can dually create and enforce its goals is tantamount to 
determining if it can actually function. Furthermore, if a population generally abides by 
the law designated by the aspiring state, it follows that to a certain degree the population 
recognizes the governing entity as legitimate. This is because “effective governmental 
control is extremely difficult to maintain without the consent of at least part of the 
population.”86 A government’s ability to control the population brings about the issue of 
whether or not a government can still be considered legitimate if it is ruling unjustly, for 	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instance. Thierry Baudet, a Dutch historian, addresses this issue, maintaining that a 
state’s ultimate authority over territory is the determiner for legitimacy, “should a 
government rule unjustly and undermine [the state’s] ‘authority’ in the sense of being 
respected or held in high esteem, [the state] would nevertheless retain [its] ‘right to 
decide’ as long as [it] maintained [its] effective control.”87 In this case, ‘right to decide’ 
refers to a government’s ability to make decisions about what sort of actions it desires to 
take or undertake, as far as governing its territory. Even though a population may not 
explicitly consent to governance, it implicitly consent to being governed by submitting to 
a state’s authority. 
External sovereignty, on the other hand, refers more simply to how an aspiring 
state’s actions are perceived by outsiders, such as entering in relations with other states or 
non-state actors. External sovereignty is therefore “the acceptance of a state by others.”88 
Both external and internal sovereignty are ultimately related to de facto sovereignty 
definitions of statehood, “when an organization succeeds in establishing internal 
sovereignty, it has gained a de facto capacity to inter into relations with other states […] 
so the entity is viewed as a sovereign state.”89 Examining an aspiring state’s actions on 
both an internal and external level are necessary in determining if the entity can be 
considered sovereign. If an actor is only able to maintain de facto sovereignty over either 
internal or external affairs exclusively, it may not be considered to be a de facto state. 
However, exhibiting one of the two categories could serve as an indicator that an actor is 
attempting to transition to de facto statehood. At the time of this thesis, the IS does 
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  Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 43.	  
88 Baudet, The Significance of borders: why representative government and the rule of law require nation 
states, 51. 
89 Ibid. 
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interact with outside actors occasionally; however these interactions are of a limited 
nature and thus far, do not include interactions with sovereign states. Interaction is 
limited predominantly to military negotiations with tribal leaders and conducting oil 
transactions, and building alliances with outside militant groups. According to Phillip 
Potter, a political scientist, the IS’s relationships with other militant organizations are 
“unusually broad, but also somewhat shallow. That is, [the IS] has many relationships 
with other militant organizations, but a disproportionate number of them have proven 
transitory and fragile […] other militants have had little choice but to engage with [the 
IS] given its strength but have kept some distance out of fear for their organizational 
autonomy over the long run.”90 Due to a lack of detailed information regarding the IS’s 
interactions with outside actors, in addition to the quickly changing and often fragile 
nature of these relationships, analysis of the IS’s political, military and economic 
characteristics will focus on activities conducted within the IS’s territory, rather than 
outside. Additionally, de facto sovereignty’s lack of explicit criteria on the exact amount 
of internal versus external actions a state must engage in demonstrates the deficiencies in 
attempting to accurately define statehood.  
2.6 Political, Military and Economic Characteristics  
Characteristics used to judge an aspiring state’s internal and external sovereignty 
can be further broken down into three categories: political, military and economic. 
Political characteristics would include any activities related to the development of a 
means to create and administer authority or laws, including a legislature, judicial system, 
law enforcement mechanism, as well as attempts to create and sustain a governing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90Philip Potter, “ISIL’s Inter-Organizational Relationships: Conflict and Cooperation,” SOCCENT Multi-
Method Assessment of ISIL, December 2014, 65. 
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structure, which may include institutions and the development of bureaucracy. Although 
a ‘government’ may entail many different facets, generally the UN General Assembly 
Official Records recognizes a government if it “exercises effective control and authority 
over all or nearly all of the national territory, and has the obedience of the bulk of the 
population of that territory in such a way that this control, authority, and obedience 
appear to be of a permanent character.”91 In this way, administrative or bureaucratic 
structures may be the means in which a government seeks to maintain the obedience and 
control of its population. Also entailed in the political category would be the diplomatic 
relations or interactions between the aspiring state and outside political actors (such as 
sovereign states and non-state actors). An analysis of the IS’s political characteristics can 
be found in Chapter 3.  
The military category would encompass any activities an aspiring state would 
undertake to develop and maintain a successful military mechanism, be it a conventional 
or non-conventional military. The relative success afforded to the military in both 
operations inside and outside the state’s territory would be important, as well as the 
effectiveness of the military in achieving its goals. Since one of the fundamental aspects 
of creating a state is maintaining a specific territory and borders, a military apparatus 
often becomes the means with which to achieve this characteristic. Even though modern 
military conflicts utilize new types of warfare (such as cyber warfare) and thus negate the 
traditional importance of territorial acquisition,92 the ability to maintain territory remains 
a keystone to achieving statehood. The success of IS’s military capabilities will be 
examined in depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 27. 
92 Hendrik Spruyt, “Origins and Development of the State,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002): 
143. 
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 The final category involves the economic characteristics of an aspiring state. 
Developing a sustainable and effective economic system is a necessary component to 
creating a functioning state. Without a source of income, neither a political nor military 
apparatus can exist. Some credence may be given to the means in which an entity raises 
funds, for example, levying taxes on a population might be construed as a more 
legitimate means of income than engaging in international arms smuggling. Economic 
characteristics also fall into broader internal and external categories, as international trade 
agreements and selling of natural resources to foreign actors would take place on an 
international scale. Even though globalization has increased the interconnectedness of 
economies between states, and therefore provides less of an opportunity for governments 
to definitively establish their own economic policies, the fact still remains that states must 
have an economy in order to function.93 Furthermore, interaction with an aspiring-state’s 
economy in the global realm would provide indication that the entity is able to enter 
relations with other states, and there fore possess a financial base for funding state 
activities. The IS’s economic activity will be analyzed in Chapter 5.  
2.7 Hybrid State Entities 
Additionally, this thesis will analyze the definitional issues in characterizing 
states, de facto states, and non-state actors like the IS. Currently, the US military uses the 
term “hybrid threat” to attempt to characterize entities that do not meet otherwise 
established of conventional or unconventional threats. However, “hybrid” does not seem 
to adequately define the IS’s nature or characteristics, due to the ambiguity of the 
definition, “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, 
terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting 	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effects.”94 A new term should be used to accurately describe political entities that are 
typically characterized as non-state actors, but practically meet the definitions of a de 
facto state. This thesis proposes the use of a new definition, “Hybrid State Entity” and 
three respective classes of Hybrid State Entities, to more accurately define actors like the 
IS in the future. “Hybrid” connotes the idea that these actors exhibit a variety of activities 
and characteristics typically associated with both states and non-state actors in politics, 
military actions, and economics. “State” is in reference to the idea that in many instances, 
these entities often look more like states, rather than organizations with minimal 
capabilities to maintain effective control or governance. When attempting to interact with 
these hybrid actors, their capabilities in state building need to be considered equally along 
with their military successes, for instance. Finally, the addition of “entity” incorporates 
the reality that these entities are not fully states in the international-law sense, as they are 
not fully recognized members of the UN. Furthermore, since these actors are not fully-
fledged states, they need not be afforded the same rights as states in Laws of War, for 
instance. In full, the term Hybrid State Entity attempts to encompass the aspects of actors 
on a more specific level than “non-state actor.” Furthermore, Hybrid State Entities can be 
classified in three different categories, depending on the level of governance and control 
they have over their respective territories: 
Class I Hybrid State Entity-In essence, a de facto state. Demonstrates very strong 
control of territory and population. Presence of a stable economic system and is able to 
consistently generate revenue. Has a monopoly on the use of violence and is unlikely to 
be internally contested militarily or politically (ex. Taiwan, Kurdistan, Palestine, 
Hezbollah).  	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Class II Hybrid State Entity-Exhibits some characteristics of a de facto state. Has 
control of majority of its territory and population. Has a fairly stable economic system 
and means of generating revenue. Generally effective in subduing internal military or 
political opposition, but may face some difficulties maintaining a monopoly on the use of 
force throughout all of its territory (ex. Kachin State, Abkhazia). 
Class III Hybrid State Entity-A weak de facto state. Has control over limited 
portions of its territory and population. Faces significant challenges to authority from 
internal military and political threats, and struggles to defend against these threats. Has a 
weak and/or unstable economic system and may face difficulties in generating revenue. 
Only maintains a monopoly on the use of force in small portions of territory, or does not 
exhibit a monopoly on the use of force at all (ex. Sinaloa Federation, Nagorno-
Karabakh). 
The three classes of Hybrid State Entities are fluid categories, in which entities 
can transition from one class to the next, as they develop or lose their capabilities. The 
following chapters of this thesis will provide additional analysis as to how the IS 
successfully represents a Class II Hybrid State Entity, and how this definition provides a 
more accurate depiction of the IS than existing definitions and theories regarding 
statehood. 
2.8 Methodology 
The sources used in this thesis consist of an array of academic articles, news 
reports, open-source intelligence reporting, social media and other primary source 
publications directly from the IS. The recent and emerging nature of subject matter 
regarding the IS poses a challenge to attaining and using relevant and adequate academic 
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scholarship. For this reason, a number of different sources are used to provide a holistic 
approach to characterizing the IS. 
 Academic articles constitute the main basis for determining the criteria used to 
judge the IS’s political, military, and economic activities. Readings on modern definitions 
of a state and explanations for the emergence of modern states over other political entities 
provide the sources used in the literature review. Additionally, US military doctrine and 
field manuals provide definitional clarification for modern terms used to discuss the 
subject matter. The combination of these two sources produce a strong historical and 
functional framework for characterizing and understanding the IS alongside traditional 
theories and examples of statehood.  
 Think tank reporting provides important analysis that is in-depth and describes the 
IS’s activities, as well as the ramifications of its activities in a broader scope. Think tanks 
such as The US Council on Foreign Relations, The Institute for the Study of War, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and companies such as Rand provide 
considerable analysis and reporting on significant events in the Middle East. Detailed 
information regarding the IS’s military capabilities is largely attained from West Point’s 
Combatting Terrorism Center. These sources provide extensive analysis of events 
happening on the ground, and the relationship between these events and the criteria used 
to determine IS’s state building capabilities. Reports and analysis produced by the above 
sources contain considerable detail and justification for conclusions drawn as such 
publications are designed to better inform policymakers of various events and their 
potential ramifications.  
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The IS’s statements and materials published and distributed on the Internet 
provide necessary primary sources that shed insight into what the IS releases to the 
public, and the means in which it does so. Information on social media, such as Tweets 
and blog posts, as well as publications such as the English language magazine Dabiq, are 
examples of primary source materials used in this thesis.  
 Finally, news reports provide the intricate details and facts regarding the IS’s 
activities on the ground. News reports are a vital and necessary source of information 
because of the IS’s recent nature. Information on the IS continues to be released in large 
volume on a daily basis through news reports; significant quantities of scholastic research 
on the IS and its activities have yet to be published. Using both western sources, such as 
The New York Times, BBC News, the Washington Post, The Economist and Middle 
Eastern sources, such as Al Jazeera, provides multiple perspectives on the IS and its 
actions. Naturally, bias from each individual news source and respective authors must be 
taken into account when analyzing news sources. 
 In order to produce an accurate visualization of the IS’s organizational and 
leadership structure, a visual network analysis is included in this thesis. The analysis 
combines information dispersed throughout numerous sources into a single chart, using 
the software, Semantica Professional 5.5. Semantica Professional 5.5 is professional-
grade software produced by Semantica Research Inc. Primary customers of this software 
includes the US Department of Defense, the US Intelligence Community, and US Law 
Enforcement. Additionally, Semantica Profressional is currently being marketed to 
private sector industries combatting insider threat issues, as well as fraud detection. 
Currently, the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of 
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Mississippi holds a license agreement for the software valued at over $811,000.95 At the 
time of this thesis, the University of Mississippi is the only university in the US that is 
actively using Semantica Professional 5.5.  Incorporating a visual network analysis of the 
IS provides additional clarity into the IS’s organization and structure, as well as the 
relationships between different individuals and facets incorporated of the organization. 
Appendix B provides a link of the complete visual analysis, hosted on the University of 
Mississippi’s Center for Intelligence and Security Studies website.96 Furthermore, small 
breakdowns of pertinent aspects of the analysis are embedded in their respective 
subsections.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
An important tenet of statehood is the presence of a government able to 
effectively govern its territory and population. Part of this necessarily includes that the 
population consent, in some form, to being governed. The population’s consent is usually 
more easily achieved if the ruling government is invested in helping improve the 
population’s standard of living. Initially, it may appear as though the IS is not invested in 
the well being of the populations under its control, given the numerous human rights 
violations it has committed against populations in its territory.97 This is most notable in 
regard to the IS’s treatment of religious minorities, such as Yazidis and Christians, as 
well as non-Sunni Muslims.98 Despite IS’s willingness to use violence against its 
population, IS does, indeed recognize the importance of public opinion to the 
effectiveness of its governance, and hopes to demonstrate its ability to effectively provide 
for populations better than existing governments. In the case of Iraq, the Shiite 
government often did not adequately provide public services and goods to Sunni 
populations. With regards to Syria, the civil war has caused great disruption to services 
and governance typically provided by Bashar al-Assad’s government. In some of its 
territories, the IS provides numerous social services, including subsidizing staple 
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products, capping rent prices, and creating a free bus system.99 Even though these 
services are not available uniformly across all of the IS’s territory, it does help maintain 
the IS’s governance. Dually causing populations to become reliant on its governance, and 
providing superior and more effective governance than “legitimate” state governments, 
allows the IS to solidify control and gain support from its populations.  The longer the IS 
is able to govern and give wealth back to the populations under its control, the longer it 
will be supported by its population. 
This chapter will demonstrate the complexity of the IS as an organization, through 
its focus on creating a sophisticated organizational structure that utilizes a chain-of-
command system to implement its goals. However, despite the IS’s short-term success in 
providing services to its population, it is unclear if the IS will be able to maintain its 
governance in the long-term. Particular focus at the end of this chapter will be paid to the 
IS’s media output and provincial services, which highlight the functionality of the IS.  
3.1 The Executive 
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Figure 2: Network Analysis-The Islamic State Executive 
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 Ruling the IS Caliphate requires an executive capacity that can dually provide 
religious and political legitimacy. This ruler must demonstrate that he is a capable leader 
in both of these respects, in order to maintain power. The current head of the IS provides 
this leadership, and has cultivated a persona which fulfills this role. 
The head of the IS, Ibrahim Awad Ibriahm Ali al Badri al Samarri,100 who more 
commonly goes by the nome de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his two executive 
deputies make up the organization’s executive tier of leadership. Al-Baghdadi is 
effectively in control of the organization, representing the ultimate authority and decision 
maker with uncontested rule. As Caliph, he is at the head of all matters concerning the IS 
Caliphate, including religious, military, and political issues.  
The IS has built a “legitimate” identity for al-Baghdadi, citing in the IS’s 
propaganda his vast religious education as a “professor, teacher, former educator, 
recognized preacher and a graduate of the Islamic University in Baghdad, where he 
finished his academic studies (BA, MA and PhD)” and military leadership abilities and 
experience.101  Thus far, the credibility of this information is questionable at best, as al-
Baghdadi has no known military command experience, and his carefully planned public 
appearances and focus on personal security make it incredibly difficult to “lead from the 
front,” especially in a military capacity. Al-Baghdadi needs to exude personal legitimacy, 
which likewise determines the IS’s legitimacy as a viable and credible organization. This 	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“A Biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” 12 August 2014, accessed 3 January 2015, 
http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/226-the-story-behind-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi. 
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is shown through the creation of his colorful, though not necessarily factual, background 
and resume. Furthermore, in proving that he is a credible and deserving leader of the IS, 
he provides legitimacy for the authority which the executive office of the IS must 
provide. 
 However, the power of the IS as an organization does not wholly rely on the 
presence of an overly charismatic or incredibly skillful leader, but also is reliant on the 
authority that the executive office of the IS provides. The IS has a strong administrative 
and organized system of governance which provides strength to the organization. This, in 
combination with the willingness to control its population using violence, could 
theoretically allow the IS, as an organization, to outlast the individual leadership of al-
Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi’s credibly as presented to the public, nor his leadership abilities 
are integral to his ability to successfully lead. This is simply because al-Baghdadi, 
through his position as the IS executive, has enough force to impose his will, regardless 
of any personal visionary thinking or charisma possessed on his part.102 Additionally, al-
Baghdadi has over four years of experience leading the IS and its predecessor 
organizations. His surprising appointment as head of the ISI in 2010 was brokered 
predominately by Samir Abed Hamad al Obeidi al Dulami, a high-ranking member who 
was formerly a colonel in the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard.103 Al Dulami was disliked by 
many of his fellow ISI members because he failed to adhere to many religious guidelines, 
but nevertheless, remained an important to the organization due to his administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Initial findings in a study of al-Baghdadi’s psychological profile indicate that holistically, al-Baghdadi is 
indeed not an overly charismatic leader: MAJ Jason Spitaletta, USMCR, Joint Staff J7 and the Johns 
Hopkins University-Applied Physics Laboratory, “Comparative Psychological Profiles: Baghadadi & 
Zawahiri,” SOCCENT Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL,” December 2014. 55. 
103 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group, November 2014, 24. 
  53	  
experience and organizational skills.104 This demonstrates that the IS, and its precursor 
organizations, understand the value of practical administrative skills over strict and 
constant adherence to Sharia doctrine. Al-Baghdadi continues this precedent during his 
rule, demonstrated in the vast number of former Iraqi Ba’athist officials employed by the 
IS throughout governmental councils and administrative functions. This relationship is 
examined further throughout this chapter. Ultimately, the executive office of the IS, 
headed by al-Baghdadi, provides and maintains the IS’s political authority. This 
demonstrates the presence of Westphalian Sovereignty, in addition to the state action of 
state-making, as the presence of a strong and effective political authority can help to 
eliminate internal rivals to the IS’s governance. 
3.2 Executive Second-Tier Leadership 
 Al-Baghdadi maintains a second tier of executive leadership through his two 
executive deputies in command of IS operations in Iraq and Syria (refer to Figure 2). Like 
many of his other high-level IS administrators, both deputies were formerly members of 
the Iraqi Ba’ath party.105 The IS deputy of Iraq, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani was a former 
high-ranking Iraqi Special Forces soldier with experience in military intelligence, who 
also worked closely with Saddam Hussein.106 Abu Ali al-Anbari, the Syrian deputy, was 
reportedly a physics teacher and member of IS’s predecessor organization, Ansar al 
Islam.107 These two senior advisors are responsible for all matters that fall under each of 
their respective territories, and report directly to al-Baghdadi. Al-Turkmani, and al-
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Anbari are reported to sit on key councils, such as the Shura Council.108 Although both 
leaders do not have deep historical ties to jihadist movements, their skills were 
recognized and utilized by the IS. 
 The IS’s executive tier of leadership provides the ability to realistically implement 
decisions decreed by an uncontested authority (al-Baghdadi). A strong executive means 
the IS is not devoting its time or efforts over in fighting regarding the organization’s 
ultimate authority, which allows for resources to be devoted for actually accomplishing 
the goals of territorial acquisition and governance. One of the executive branch’s 
strengths is the presence of well-educated and experienced subordinates and the 
hierarchal, chain of command structure responsible for implementing executive 
decisions. This allows for the IS’s time to be used effectively, and gives autonomy to 
local leaders with the practical knowledge on how to best implement decisions given 
local conditions. Furthermore, the IS’s leadership does not revolve around a charismatic 
personality, but rather a leader who has consolidated his control and who has placed a 
number of skilled and experienced leaders at the top of the command structure. This 
provides the potential for the executive command structure to possibly outlive the 
executive himself, and thus become a more permanent governing authority. Like the 
executive, the second-tier executive leadership demonstrates the state action of state 
making. Furthermore, the second-tier executive provides evidence of domestic 
sovereignty, since it provides formal organization of political authority.  
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3.3 The Wilayat
 
 
 The IS’s organizational structure contains approximately eight to ten national-
level councils, which report directly to al-Baghdadi and constitute the overarching 
authorities regarding the strategic planning, military operations and civilian 
administration for all of the IS’s territory.109 Many of the councils’ functions also present 
on a smaller district or local level. These smaller departments work jointly with local 
authorities in specific towns or districts, in addition to implementing directives from their 
respective national councils. The degree to which councils have been able to exist and 
effectively implement their directives and achieve their goals consistently throughout all 
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Figure 3: Network Analysis-The Islamic State’s Wilayat 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne. 2015. 
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the IS’s territory is difficult to holistically determine; however, generally the IS appears 
to be able to implement more governance in large urban centers under its control, such as 
Raqqa. Overall, the IS appears to employ between 20,000-31,000 fighters and 
administrators to keep the sate functioning.110 Furthermore, due to the diverse 
backgrounds and experience of those under its employment, IS has a large variety of skill 
sets in which to draw on for placing individuals in different tasks.111  For the practical 
purposes of governing its territory, the IS divides its territory into 18 provinces, or 
Wilayat, which each have an appointed governor (Wali).112  In August 2014, The Wall 
Street Journal reported that the estimated territory controlled by the Islamic State varies 
from 12,000 square miles to 35,000 square miles.113 This would equate to territory 
ranging from the size of Belgium to that of Jordan.114 Figure 4 provides a map that 
attempts to depict the IS’s territorial holdings as of August 14, 2014.115  
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The fact that the IS has specifically divided its territory into 18 provinces, and 
plans to establish a multi-faceted governing structure in each that ultimately answers to a 
higher central authority demonstrates Westphalian, domestic and interdependence 
sovereignty. Each of these types of sovereignty requires the presence of a political 
authority that is able to maintain effective control of its territory and population. 
Establishing a base for organizing and governing its territory (through its system of 
Walis) through a theoretical system of governance for each province that dually allows 
overhead control from a central authority, in addition to providing local autonomy able to 
more effectively cope with specific conditions and issues in individual areas serves as an 
indicator that the IS desires a functional state, fully under its authority and control. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Islamic State's Sanctuaries, as of 14 August 2014 
Source: Lewis, Jessica. “Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent.” September 2013. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf. Accessed 
26 September 2014. 
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3.4 The Shura Council
 
 
The Shura Council is the highest advisory body for the IS, and represents the IS’s 
legislative capacity. This council consists of 9-11 members, who are reportedly all Iraqi 
and mostly former Ba’athists, and is responsible for disseminating al-Baghdadi’s 
directives down the chain of command. Furthermore, it often makes rulings on laws and 
how to implement them. Since IS laws are based on religion, the Shura Council’s 
responsibilities at times overlap with those of the Sharia Council, which coordinates 
religious matters. Theoretically, the Shura Council also approves al-Baghdadi’s various 
Figure 5: Network Analysis-The Islamic State Shura Council 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne. 2015. 
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appointments, and would be responsible for removing al-Baghdadi as Caliph if he failed 
to carry out his duties.116  
The Shura Council represents one of the top tiers of the IS’s organizational 
structure, as it disseminates information directly from the executive to other councils and 
provinces. This is a strong indicator of interdependence sovereignty, as it helps control 
the spread of information and ideas to the populations under the control if the IS. 
Additionally, the Shura Council theoretically strengthens the political structure of the IS, 
since it strengthens the authority of the executive, because this council has the ability to 
remove the individual Caliph from his position, and choose the replacement leader. 
Ultimately, the Shura Council boosts the IS’s effective control of its population, as it 
provides a means in which to more succinctly and easily distribute information and 
control from the central governing authority throughout its territory. 
3.5 The Sharia Council
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Figure 6: Network Analysis-The Islamic State Sharia Council 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne. 2015. 
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The IS’s judiciary capacity is found in the Sharia Council, which is described as the “the 
most powerful body of the Islamic State.”117 Al-Baghdadi directly heads the Sharia 
Council, which consists of six additional members. The Sharia Council deals with 
compliance on religious matters and party discipline, issuing rules and consequential 
punishments and penalties for infringement. The IS has garnered significant attention in 
the international media due to the extremely violent nature of its punishments. However, 
law enforcement based on Sharia Council directives, in the eyes of the IS, demonstrates 
good governance for its population. For example, beheading highway robbers in Raqqa 
because they are breaking Islamic law regarding stealing is helping to protect the 
population and provide lawful order.118  Additionally, the Sharia council controls the IS’s 
religious police force, which is separate from the civilian police force. Religious police, 
both male and female, supervise Islamic conduct throughout the IS’s territory.119  The 
Sharia Council also controls the religious court system, determining the appropriate 
punishments issued for various religious crimes. Finally, the council heads the IS’s 
ideological outreach, both inside and outside the IS’s territory. The IS seeks religious 
legitimacy from religious scholars, which is then disseminated through the Sharia 
Council. 120 This typically takes the form of guidance on educational standards for the IS, 
which is solely religious and includes no secular or vocational training.121  
 Because the Sharia Council provides a standard set of laws and a consistent set of 
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as a means in which to maintain authority and effective control over the IS’s territory, 
through an incredibly multi-faceted and formal political authority.  Additionally, it 
regulates the flow of information to the population, as it controls educational standards 
and curriculum. Once again, the IS demonstrates the presence of Westphalian, domestic 
and interdependence sovereignty.  
3.6 The Media Council 
The IS’s Media Council, and its various products, are perhaps the organization’s 
most successful ventures, operating essentially unchecked without adequate opposition 
and therefore commanding (and winning) the information war to promote the IS’s 
legitimacy.122 The IS uses its media output to demonstrate that it is a credible and 
legitimate governing entity as an Islamic Caliphate to both its residents and to the Islamic 
community. Because media is so closely tied to the organization’s legitimacy, the IS 
places a large emphasis on producing quality products in a timely manner. Writers, 
bloggers and researchers that are spread throughout many areas and countries, as well as 
speak multiple languages, staff the media department.123 Specific institutions within the 
media department, such as the Al-Hayat Media Center, provide services to employees 
spreading media products. In the case of the Al-Hayat Media Center, this comes in the 
way of multi-language support and the production of English-language materials geared 
toward western audiences.124 Even though the IS has an official organizational 
spokesman, this is more of symbolic means to demonstrate the IS’s official party rhetoric, 	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as the IS is perfectly capable of spreading its message through alternate means. In 
addition to disseminating information on a global level, the media department is also 
located provincially. Provincial media reports local news and events to the population, 
and distributes information through the circulation of internal hardcopy materials.125 
Through its various media operations, the IS has successfully developed a monopoly on 
the control of information spread within its territory, in addition to how it is portrayed in 
the world.   
 The IS uses a number of mediums to produce a variety of media and 
informational products. Best known is its presence on social media sites, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and various blogging websites and jihadist forums. Additionally, the 
IS produces films, such as “The Clanging of the Swords IV,” which it released before its 
June 2014 offensive.126 These visual productions show excellent command of visual 
effects and graphics, which effectively appeal to younger populations accustomed to 
modern video and film capabilities and techniques.127 The IS has also produced Dabiq, an 
English-language magazine released online, which has been compared considerably to Al 
Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.128 This magazine originated in the form of Islamic State News 
and Islamic State Reports, which discussed military gains and civil administration 
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successes, respectively.129  However, these two magazines combined to form Dabiq in 
July 2014.130 The very quick transition between these two magazines, and the detail of 
information combined with the information’s slick and professional presentation, 
demonstrates that the IS has had a structured media organization in place for some 
time.131 
 Content of the IS’s materials typically revolves around either establishing the 
legitimacy of the organization through religious reasoning or touting the successes of the 
IS’s governance and military campaigns. Both of these types of messages seek to further 
the IS’s identity as a credible Islamic institution in both the ideological and practical 
sense. The IS uses a rhetorical strategy in its media that emphasizes the Caliphate is a 
legitimate and functional entity, both in religious terms, as well in practical success on 
the ground. Although other extremist militant organizations also use religious ideology to 
legitimize their actions, the IS is creating and marketing a specific brand image that 
promotes the organization as a viable state. An example of this can be found by 
comparing Special Operation Command Central Command’s word frequency of the IS’s 
Dabiq English-language magazine and Al Qaeda’s Resurgence English-language 
magazine. Although there are some similarities between the rhetoric used in the two 
magazines, there is a striking difference in that Dabiq focuses heavily on religion, while 
Resurgence centers on warfare.132 Although this specific analysis only focuses on one 
English-language product, it is apparent that using religious reasoning to justify the 
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existence of an Islamic Caliphate is a technique gainfully employed in the IS’s media 
output. 	  
  The IS also issues decrees to its followers on how to best serve the organization. 
This message has changed over time. Concurrently, the IS’s decrees to followers have 
transitioned from “perform[ing] Hijrah-participate in jihad by traveling to Iraq and 
Syria,” “declar[ing] Bay’at-remain in place and create communities of ISIS support” and 
finally, to “conduct[ing] Lone-Wolf attacks-remain in place and conduct attacks against 
the enemies of ISIS.”133 Essentially, the IS has changed its message for followers to 
“preform hijrah” by immigrating to IS territory in Iraq and Syria to remaining in their 
respective countries and attacking governments that do not support the IS. Such decrees 
demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the IS’s media; the IS must concurrently produce 
media products that recruit followers, give decrees to supporters, demonstrate that it is a 
legitimate governing authority and show it can militarily defeat its adversaries.  
The IS’s media output faces several problems; however, the largest is producing 
material and disseminating it before the information is removed and users are denied 
access to sites. By effectively “crowd sourcing” its propaganda, the IS ensures its 
information is placed in vast quantities in numerous locations. Thus far, the IS is setting 
the precedent for spreading information in this way. This technique demonstrates that the 
IS is cognizant that in an age of modern technology, speed is vital to maintaining a 
monopoly on the spread of information. Since the IS’s media wing is constantly adapting 
how it spreads its information, the IS is able to put out information first. This allows the 	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IS to control the information content being spread, as little to no competing information 
is being made available. Furthermore, as the IS’s users are driven from well-known sites, 
they turn to unofficial and unusual websites and forums, which makes them increasingly 
difficult to find and subdue. For example, when the IS’s entire Twitter structure was 
removed in August 2014, it transferred many of its accounts to the Russian social 
networking website, VKontake.134 Other techniques for spreading information include the 
development of the “Dawn of Glad Tidings” app, which the IS’s supporters can 
download onto their android phone. The app then posts tweets containing the IS’s content 
to users’ accounts.135 The IS has also created “Twitter bombs,” or tweets designed to 
incorporate popular trending hashtags to redirect conversation to the IS’s specific 
content.136 This was the case during the 2014 World Cup, when the IS used the hashtag 
“#WorldCup” (refer to Figure 7). 
In reference to a beheaded Sunni police officer, one tweet read, “This is our ball. 
It’s made of skin #WorldCup” with an attached picture of said decapitated head.137  The 
IS is an organization that is very in touch with how younger audience are using and 
receiving information (through social media websites, online forums, etc.).  More 
importantly, the IS is technologically savvy, able to use these new media forms to its 
advantage. This allows the IS to retain a monopoly on creating and dispersing 
information within its territorial holdings, in addition to sharing information to the 
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outside world about its purpose and activities. Therefore, the IS is able to better maintain 
its authority as a governing entity, as it holds the means in which to distribute information 
to the populations under its control.   
 
The IS’s media wing is a fairly disciplined entity, yet it does occasionally face 
difficulties with false information being spread over the Internet. In response to this false 
information, the IS seems to have implemented a credibility check capability, although it 
is still unclear to what extent this is being used, or how many individuals operating in this 
capacity exist.138 Essentially, users go behind those who have posted false information 
and cite that it goes against what is officially been decreed by the IS.139 This 
demonstrates that the IS cares about its credibility as well as the information distributed 
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Figure 7: Tweet Demonstrating the 
IS’s use of #WorldCup 
Source: Twitter. 12 June 
2014. 	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itself and its activities. Users that claim to be the IS, and spread “official” IS information 
threaten the IS’s monopoly on information. Finally, like any entity with military 
capabilities, the IS faces problems maintaining operational security, that is, keeping its 
goals, capabilities and objectives (usually in a military sense) a secret until they are 
actually accomplished. The IS has encouraged its members to only post about past 
victories, and not future ones.140 However, the potential for prematurely released 
information of strategic value always remains a concern. The IS recognizes the need to 
protect its military objectives from public knowledge. This is a problem that is also faced 
by the conventional militaries of recognized states. The IS walks a fine line between 
strategically using media to spread fear when approaching targets, and maintaining 
secrecy so the spread of information does not compromise its military actions.  
The importance of the Media Council lies in the means in which the IS is able to 
portray itself to the populations it controls and the world. It must spread messages that 
argue first and foremost it is a legitimate Caliphate, essentially a state in an Islamic 
discourse. The IS needs to portray it is a relevant and viable government, demonstrated 
through its proficiency at using traditional print, and new online mediums to spread its 
messages. Also, the IS is very involved in the content of its media output, so much so that 
it is attempting to stop “unofficial” IS sources. The IS has proved itself to be very 
successful and adept at establishing a monopoly on the control of information in its 
territory, as well as its image in the world. Since the IS is able to effectively project an 
image of itself that demonstrates effective political, military and economic control, it can 
appear as a practically functioning de facto state. Demonstrating that it is able to execute 
state-like governing functions in parts of its territory, likewise shows the IS’s strengths, 	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compared to the weaknesses and shortcomings of governance from existing sovereign 
states of Syria and Iraq. 
 
3.7 The Provincial Council and Public Services
 
Figure 8: Network Analysis-The Islamic State Provincial Council and Public Services in Aleppo, 
Syria 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne. 2015. 	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The IS’s Provincial Council oversees the civilian administration of the 
organization’s 18 provinces.141 Each of the 18 provinces has a regional governor, who 
presides over a local structure that mirrors the IS’s central structure. For example, each 
province has a Sharia commander, a military commander and a security commander.142 
There are some indications that the IS is allowing locals, and not individuals appointed 
by the IS, to become provincial governors in territory where the IS has a weaker 
presence.143 This demonstrates that the IS does not have equal political (or military) 
control throughout all its territory. Additionally, the IS on some occasions moves its 
governors around to new territories.144 This ensures individuals with ruling experience 
are in power, but not allowed to remain in power long enough to build an extensive 
provincial or regional base of support that could rival the authority of the IS.  
On the provincial level, governance can be divided into two categories: 
administration and services. The administration sector entails a mirror of the realms the 
national councils dictate, such as religious education, security law enforcement, media 
and tribal affairs. Provincial services fall under the control of the “Islamic Administration 
of Public Services,” or the General Services Committee. This administration oversees the 
building and maintenance of infrastructure, electricity, sanitation, water, agricultural 
systems, cleaning and repairing roads, and other essential services, such as bread 
production.145 By controlling all services in its provinces in a monopolistic fashion, the IS 	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is able to further assert its control over the populations in the territory it controls. Without 
access to basic needs and services, the population would be more likely to rise up against 
the IS’s rule. The longer the IS is able to govern and give wealth back to the populations 
under its control, the longer it will be supported by its population. 
Despite maintaining control over different sectors on a provincial level, IS 
governance on the provincial level has experienced many gaps in providing services, as 
well as poor long-term decisions in how to distribute and manage services. Perhaps the 
most illustrative example of this is the IS’s control of Lake Assad, a reservoir in the al-
Raqqa province. In addition to being an important source of electricity for residents of the 
province, the dam also provides a significant source of fresh drinking water for the local 
population.146 Under the Syrian government’s administration, the power plant adjoining 
the lake only operated two of its eight electrical turbines part-time. When the IS gained 
control, however, it began operating all eight turbines at full-time in an effort to provide 
electricity to larger numbers of people.147 A drought in the region, combined with the 
running of all turbines resulted in the quick depletion of water from the lake.148 In the 
long term, choices such as this will result in less people receiving electricity and water (as 
the lake’s water supply is completely depleted), rather than more, as the IS administration 
intended. The management and mismanagement of services and resources on a provincial 
level will prove very significant in determining the IS’s ability to effectively govern its 
territory, especially in the long-term. Even though the IS may currently maintain effective 
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control over its population, and exist as an organized and authoritative political structure, 
the decisions it is making regarding how to provide key state- like functions (such as the 
management providing services to its populations) serve as strong indicators as to the 
feasibility of the IS’s governance and future failures in the long-term. Since the IS’s main 
goal is to create a functional state, failure to actually function in the eyes of the greater 
population would prove highly detrimental to the IS’s overarching goals and legitimacy 
as a governing authority.  
 In addition to poor planning in the use of key resources, the IS’s ability to 
maintain governance over the long-term is called into question due to their educational 
policies. Proficiency in numerous technical tasks is required in order to maintain many 
services and adequately utilize resources, such as the production of electricity and oil. 
The IS’s current educational policies focus strictly on religious subject matter, and 
provide no vocational training or professional education. Without the creation of a new 
professional class to run the technical, yet vital, aspects of the IS, the IS’s long-term 
survival is called into question. The IS’s poor long-term planning and lack of authority 
throughout all of its territory doemonstrates that the IS does not possess complete 
authoirty, and would thuse demonstrates a lack of de fato sovereignty. However, it also 
deomonstrates the shortcomings of attempting to apply, in practice, the definition of de 
facto sovereignty as it is unclear to the degree of control an entitiy must posseess in order 
to be considered de facto. For this reason, the HSE definition of statehood becoems 
increasingly applicable. Applying the Class II HSE definition takes into account that the 
IS does possess some degree of de facto control, but not throughout all of its territory.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 The IS has developed numerous councils that are responsible for many facets of 
governance on a national, regional and local level. Cognizant of the resources and 
necessary facets to effectively govern, the IS has focused on creating an organization 
possessing executive, judicial, legislative and social services functions. These councils 
Figure 9: Areas of Governance, as of July 2014 
Source: Caris, Charles and Reynolds, Samuel. “Middle East Security Report 22: ISIS 
governance in Syria.” July 2014. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf. Accessed  26 
September 2014. 
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and their respective bureaus are complex and have been successful in many respects, 
notably in media campaigns and implementing Islamic Sharia law in the IS’s territory. 
The IS desires effective governance over its territory and is making considerable attempts 
to achieve this. However, problems are manifest in IS’s ability to consistently govern all 
the territory it holds, as well as continuing to provide basic services to the people in its 
territory in the long term.   
 The IS is able to exist and even entertain the idea of appealing to its population 
predominately due to regional instability and a lack of effective governance on behalf of 
the Syrian and Iraqi governments. Even though most populations allow the IS 
uncontested governance out of fear, the fact remains that in many circumstances, 
especially for Sunnis in Iraq, life under the IS is of higher quality than life prior to the 
IS’s governance.149 Some residents may view a “stick and carrot” approach, that is the 
“stick of strict Sharia law” and “carrot” of social services as preferable to the perceived 
“repressive, sectarian and foreign-influenced governments and incapable “moderate” 
oppositions” exhibited by the “legitimate” government in Iraq and rebel opposition 
groups in Syria.150 However, there are several accounts that indicate that residents in IS’s 
territory are not fully contented with the IS’s governance. For example, in Raqqa crowds 
have refused to take part in public stonings.151 Also in Raqqa, a local schoolteacher 
released an Internet video in 2013 titled The Woman In Pants that “lambasted ISIS for 
[its] draconian rule and religious obscurantism.”152 Despite the presence of some 
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opposition, the IS maintains the advantage in that the governments in Iraq and Syria are 
largely unable to protect their populations from the IS’s harsh governance.  
The IS recognizes the importance of effectively governing the territory it gains, as 
well as the public opinion of the majority of the people living in that territory. From the 
IS’s perspective, its violent actions are fair, justified and represent good governance. An 
organized and detailed administrative structure is in place which allows for multiple 
governmental functions, including legislative and judicial branches to exist and actually 
implement the directives issued to them by the IS executive. Furthermore, the IS provides 
services to the majority of the populations under its rule, in most instances, arguably 
better than their former existing “legitimate” governments. It attempts to govern 
throughout a large territory on a local, regional and national level, utilizing a new 
administrative capacity that was not fully present in its precursor organizations of AQI. 
The various councils and their respective functions demonstrate the presence of 
Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty, in addition to state making, as 
the IS seeks to eliminate internal rivals to its governance. This further indicates the 
presence of internal sovereignty, which contributes strongly to the hypothesis that the IS 
is functionally a de facto state. However, it is unclear the degree to which the IS’s 
governance and effective control is present throughout all of its territory. Additionally, 
the theoretical definition to how much ‘effective control’ a political authority must 
control throughout its territory in order to be considered a de facto state does not provide 
specific criteria, therefore making it difficult to judge the exact degree of effective control 
the IS maintains. Finally, the ability of the IS to continue to maintain effective control of 
its territory and populations in the future is questionable, at best. These reasons, in 
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addition to the lack of clarity regarding the degree to which the IS is interacting with 
outside entities make it difficult to declare, with certainty, that the IS is a de facto state. 
However, when applying the definitions of the classes of HSE to the situation, the IS in 
the actions throughout its territory, would fall into a Class II HSE. The IS exhibits some 
characteristics of a de facto state, as it has control of majority of its territory and 
population and is generally effective in subduing internal political opposition. However, 
as evidenced throughout this chapter, the IS faces some difficulties in maintaining 
effective governance throughout all of its territory, presently and in the long term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  76	  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: MILITARY CAPABILITES OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
 
The IS’s military capabilities, specifically the “conventional” nature of many of 
the IS’s military campaigns, have garnered much attention by the media. The IS’s 
military wing is under direct control of al-Baghdadi, through the Military Council. 
Furthermore, the IS’s military apparatus is distinctly separate from internal policing 
activities, and has its own specific goals that focus on the acquisition of new territory and 
the defense of the acquired territory. In addition to conventional tactics, the IS’s military 
uses traditional insurgency tactics that incorporate guerilla style fighting. This 
combination of conventional and insurgency tactics, according to the Small Wars 
Journal, warrants terming the IS as a ‘hybrid’ threat, that is, an entity that combines 
multiple fighting-style tactics to achieve its aspirations.153 
4.1 Leadership  
The Military Council heads the IS’s military affairs and dictates the IS’s 
overarching campaign to win more territory, while defending the territory it already 
holds.154 Most of the leaders on this council have military experience, either in Iraq, or as 
foreign fighters elsewhere. This council provides the directives for the movement of 
foreign fighters, military supplies, logistics, compensating the families of dead fighters 
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and the deployment of explosives.155 
 
 
The IS’s military capability was largely built by Haji Bakr, a senior IS official 
appointed by al-Baghdadi. Bakr allegedly purged the IS and its precursor organizations of 
non-Iraqi senior leadership, replacing these leaders with former Iraqi Ba’athist officials. 
Many of these new leaders served as commanders in the Iraqi military,156 and therefore, 
brought both professionalism and conventional military experience to the organization. 
Most of the IS’s military leaders have experience in fighting in both traditional military 
campaigns, as well as in insurgency and guerilla warfare. For example one of the 
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Figure 10: Network Analysis- The Islamic State’s Military Leadership 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne.2015. 
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members of the IS’s military council is Abu Muhanad al Sweidawi, who was a former 
Lieutenant Colonel in Saddam Hussein’s air defense intelligence organization.157 
Conversely, the head of the military council, Omar al Shishani, is a former Georgian 
army sergeant from Chechnya, who has experience leading a well trained group of 
Chechen fighters in Syria since 2013.158 Generally, most military leaders have prior 
battlefield experience that adds a level of professionalism to the higher ranks.159 Their 
knowledge not only extends to military tactics, but also the logistical aspects of waging 
war as a conventional military force. 
 The experience possessed by the IS’s military leadership, as well as the fact that 
the military structure must report to the IS’s overall political structure, through the 
Military Council, greatly strengthens the IS’s political structure. The IS’s political 
authority is not in competition with the military apparatus, but rather commands it. 
Additionally, the diverse expertise of the military leadership in both conventional and 
irregular military tactics allows for a greater chance of military success. The IS’s military 
success allows the IS as a whole to maintain its borders, as well as gain new territory. 
Furthermore, military success that is ultimately brokered from an overarching political 
authority strengthens the authority of this political authority, as well as the effective 
control the government has over the population.  
Many foreign fighters make up the ranks of the IS’s military. Around 15,000 
foreign fighters are employed by the IS.160 These fighters generally have military 
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experience in insurgency-style fighting, and hail from numerous countries; however, 
almost half of the IS’s foreign fighters are from just five countries.161 The degree to 
which the IS relies on foreign fighters to fill its military ranks demonstrates that, contrary 
to what it may portray to the populations under its control, the IS is not an organization 
with predominately Iraqi or Syrian members.162 It is unlikely foreign fighters are 
receiving adequate monetary compensation for their military service to the IS.  Given a 
lack of compensation, the question arises if foreign fighters will continue to fight for the 
IS in the long term. Since many fighters are not indigenous to Iraq or Syria, they 
predominantly seem to be fighting for personal gain. Once a new a new conflict emerges 
that offers additional opportunities for foreign fighters, will these fighters remain with the 
IS? Adequately integrating foreign fighters into Syrian and Iraqi society in order to retain 
their skills will pose difficulties for the IS, as will recruiting more indigenous populations 
into the IS’s military.  
The degree to which the IS relys on foreign fighters to conduct and execute its 
objectives across its territory has implications on the status of its de facto sovereignty. If 
the IS currently relies heavily on the foreign fighters, but later the foregin fithres choose 
to leave the IS’s employment, this could pose negative ramificaitons on the IS’s ability to 
effectively govern its territory. At the same time, it is unlikley all foreign fighters would 
leave at the same, leaving some of the IS’s territory with more control than other areas. 
Once again, this calls into question the effectiveness of the definition of de facto 
sovereignty. Class II HSE, and in the future, a possible degradation to Class III HSE 	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more appropriately deomonstrates the nature of the IS’s ability to govern and maintain 
effective control over its territorial holdings.  
 
 
Figure 11: Flow of Foreign Fighters to Syria 
Source: Thorp, Gene and Sharma, Swati. “Foreign fighters flow into Syria.” The 
Washington Post. 27 January 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-
fighters-flow-to-syria/2015/01/27/7fa56b70-a631-11e4-a7c2-
03d37af98440_graphic.html. Accessed 14 March 2015. 
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4.2 Recruitment 
Overall, the IS appears remarkably similar to western conventional militaries in 
its development of recruitment and training programs, as well as developing a system of 
“active duty” service and rest and relaxation time. A large aspect of maintaining a 
military force requires both recruiting new troops, as well as training recruits and current 
troops alike. The IS does appear to have a long-term plan for professionalizing its troops 
through training.163 Many training camps exist throughout the IS’s territory, and this 
number has increased since 2013.164 Furthermore, active recruitment of new troops is 
occurring both inside and outside the IS’s territory. Inside the IS’s territory, numerous 
recruitment centers have been established in population centers. The IS readily broadcasts 
the locations of these centers.165 Detailing the recruitment and training process for all 
fighters is difficult. However, the Brookings Doha Center explains the process through 
several interviews it conducted with fighters. After securing transportation from an 
existing IS member and arriving to Syria or Iraq, the recruit is brought to a pre-arranged 
location with other recruits. The recruits’ personal information is logged and financial 
donations are accepted. Recruit training begins with several weeks of religious 
indoctrination and learning basic military skills. These military skills include the use of 
pistols, RPGs and occasionally mortars. Sometimes additional training is given for more 
complicated weapons. Following their completion of training, the recruits are assigned 
guard duty for several weeks before being sent to frontline military operations.166 The 
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presence of a recruitment and training program for fighters, even if it only exists on a 
limited basis, indicates that the IS has an established system, the means and the desire to 
continue its military operations on a long-term basis. The recruit training process also 
requires logistical considerations (recruit information is logged, passports are copied, 
recruits are assigned guard duty then transferred to new duty locations), which the IS is 
willing to provide. Furthermore, there is evidence that military units rotate from “active” 
duty fighting in the frontlines to days off in “liberated” regions, as well as units’ 
deployments to numerous “bases.”167 Such actions demonstrate the presence of 
professional commanders of troops that are not only conventional in their tactical fighting 
abilities, but also in their cognizance of maintaining troop morale and the logistical 
considerations necessary to move large numbers of people and military supplies from 
garrison to the battlefield and vice versa.  
The IS’s development of recruitment and training programs, as well as cognizance 
of the need for soldiers to recuperate after fighting demonstrates that, to a certain degree, 
the IS understands the importance of Schofield’s Definition of Discipline, which is 
commonly used to teach principles of military leadership, “the discipline which makes 
the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical 
treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than make an 
army.”168 By creating a military structure that develops the skills of soldiers, recognizes 
the importance of placing different skill sets in different fighting capabilities, and 
rewarding soldiers for front line duty, the IS creates and retains soldiers that are 
appreciated and therefore, more willing to continue to fight. The brutality and viciousness 	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that is often characteristic of the IS’s soldiers would not be possible without adequate 
treatment of the soldiers themselves. Like most conventional modern militaries today, the 
IS’s military is highly organized, and aware of the impact of high troop morale on the 
battlefield.  Ultimately, this organization and understanding of how to run a conventional 
military translates to the IS’s ability to wage war, and thus eliminate rivals outside its 
territory. Eliminating rivals thus allows the IS, as a political entity, to maintain its 
authority. This is a strong indicator of the presence of de facto sovereignty. However, it is 
again difficult to discern the degree to which these conventional tactics are being applied, 
and therefore, if the IS can be solidly defined as fully possessing de facto sovereignty. 
 4.3 Tactics 
 The overarching military strategy for the IS uses blended tactics that are applied 
to a wide variety of situations to achieve the overarching strategic goal of acquiring 
territory. From a military point of view, the IS has proven capable fighting as both a light 
infantry force backed by heavy weapons, and as a Maoist style guerilla force.169  
Possessing both conventional military capabilities as a light infantry force as well as 
irregular-guerilla style tactics makes the IS a unique military force. Guerilla insurgency-
type operations can prove incredibly successful against larger conventional forces; 
however, possessing conventional fighting capabilities gives the IS a sense of legitimacy 
in the military sense. Given the style of attacks conducted by the IS, it does not appear 
that the organization is making any serious attempts in the short term to acquire territory 
outside of Syria and Iraq. Even though the IS has declared it has global aspirations to 
create its Caliphate, so far it would be difficult to practically accomplish this from a 
military perspective. Establishing and maintaining effective control over territory as a 	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functional political authority is paramount for the IS to achieve its goal of establishing a 
Caliphate. Practically, the IS can only continue to exert this control over a given territory, 
until it develops the functional ability to govern additional territory. Furthermore, the 
degree of military control the IS exerts throughout its territory is difficult to analyze, and 
therefore, so is determining if the IS possesses de facto sovereignty. Class II HSE would 
be a better characterization of the IS, because it takes into account that the IS may only 
exert control over part of its territory, rather than all or no territory exclusively.   
4.4 Objectives  
The presence of a chain of command authority structure allows military leaders on 
the ground to have some autonomy regarding how to accomplish their objectives.170 This 
is advantageous because regional commanders are more familiar with the details of their 
objectives than national-level leaders. Additionally, this allows battles to be fought on 
multiple fronts at the same time. Strategically, the IS’s goals for acquiring territory in 
Iraq and Syria vary slightly, yet both ultimately revolve around gaining and maintaining 
territory. The IS’s objectives for Syria include controlling the Euphrates River, seizing 
critical oil infrastructure, establishing freedom of maneuver through the Kurdish areas of 
Syria, expelling the remaining regime forces from their bases in Eastern Syria and seizing 
critical supply lines along the Turkish border.171  It is important to note that the IS’s 
strategy in both Syria and Iraq includes gaining access to important resources, such as oil, 
water and grain, in addition to military targets.172 In order to provide services to its 	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population, the IS requires key resources. The only way to attain these resources is 
through military acquisition, and logically it makes sense to seize key natural resources 
near populations that are under the IS’s control. The IS’s objectives in Iraq focus more on 
targeting Sunni urban centers and gaining control of transportation routes in Sunni 
regions.173 Sunni urban centers provide the IS with the opportunity to provoke sectarian 
tensions. Additionally, the IS seeks to acquire transportation routes which are a necessity 
for controlling the movement of goods and people throughout the IS’s territory.174  
4.5 Urban Tactics  
Generally, when attacking urban areas, the IS uses a specific set of tactics. First, 
the military prepares the urban area by “setting the conditions for uncontested rule.”175 
This includes undermining the local government and frightening the local population 
through assassinations, detonating IEDs and VBIEDS, and broadcasting past military 
successes through propaganda. 176 These tactics were implemented in Syria’s Dier 
Neivez-zor province from April-July 2014.177 This has proved a fairly successful tactic, 
as numerically superior Iraqi forces fled the IS’s June 2014 advance on Mosul.178 
Following the preparatory measures, the IS’s forces conduct military attacks. These either 
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manifest themselves as mass casualty urban attacks or as attrition against military 
opponents’ capabilities and morale.179 Mass casualty attacks often target minority groups 
and further the IS’s goal of increasing sectarian tensions, as was the case during the IS’s 
summer 2014 attacks against the Iraqi town of Amerli, which has a mostly Shia Turkmen 
population.180 Effecting the opponent’s capabilities is achieved by overwhelming the 
opponent’s capability to defend. The IS’s willingness to use extreme brutality in its 
fighting tactics negatively affects its opponents’ morale. Following a successful military 
attack, the IS’s synchronized military and political personnel move into the urban area 
and begin establishing governance.181 This holistic system ensures a governing authority 
is in place, with a military force capable of establishing compliance with the governing 
authority’s directives. The IS then coerces the local population to maintain their jobs, 
while foreign fighters become managers. Governance is then solidified through providing 
services to the population and building infrastructure, as well as maintaining a 
sophisticated record-keeping system.182 This complex and multi-faceted strategy 
indicates that considerable planning goes into conducting military campaigns, as well as 
synchronization between military and political units. The IS’s military has specified 
goals, as well as a proven system for accomplishing these goals. Without military 
leadership that has experience in conducting conventional military campaigns, as well as 
insurgency-type operations, the IS’s tactics would undoubtedly prove unsuccessful. The 
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presence of these characteristics demonstrates that the IS has command over its military 
capabilities and is therefore more likely to exert effective military, and therefore political, 
control over its territory. 
4.6 Adversaries  
An important aspect of the IS’s military success, particularly in its summer 2014 
offensive through Iraq, is the nature of the IS’s adversaries, or the lack thereof. The 
predominate adversaries the IS has encountered are the Iraqi military, Kurdish fighters, 
Syrian opposition groups and Syrian government troops. The Iraqi military’s troops have 
thus far not presented a significant challenge to the IS’s authority. This is evident in the 
well-publicized retreat of 30,000 Iraqi soldiers during the IS’s June 2014 advance 
towards Mosul.183 Kurdish fighters, on the other hand, have proved a tougher adversary 
for the IS. Fighters from the Kurdish Peshmerga are generally touted as having higher 
morale, discipline and motivation than their Iraqi counterparts. The Peshmerga was 
successful in defending Erbil, a city in the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq. However, 
since the initial U.S. airstrikes were geared towards helping defend Erbil,184 it is difficult 
to judge how the Peshmerga would have fared on their own. The impact of the United 
State’s entrance into battle through airstrikes is outside the scope of this thesis.185 Finally, 
Syrian opposition groups and Syrian government forces provide the last main form of 
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opposition to the IS. Numerous Syrian opposition groups have declared war on the IS.186 
Following the IS’s successful expansion to Anbar province in Iraq in early 2014, the IS 
was successfully able to defeat Syrian opposition groups and gain territory in Eastern 
Syria.187 As the IS continues to expand further in Syria, it will likely encounter resistance 
from Syrian opposition and Syrian army troops. Due to the lack of a strong military 
adversary, the question arises of whether the IS has been successful at acquiring territory 
due to actual military strength and strategy, or rather as a product of fortuitous 
circumstances and opportunistic thinking. A lack of a serious opponent makes it difficult 
to judge how effective the IS’s “conventional” and insurgency tactics are, if put to the 
test. Regardless, the IS has proved it has been able to craft a tactics that take advantage of 
the circumstances availed to it on the battlefield. Presence of a strong military opponent 
notwithstanding, so far, this has proved a fairly successful strategy. Unfortunately, 
definitions of de facto sovereignty do not explicitly dictate the degree of effective 
military control an aspiring state must posses in order to also possess de facto 
sovereignty. 
4.7 Support Operations and Capabilities  
Successful militaries are equally dependent on their support operations (such as 
intelligence and logistics) as they are on tactics. The IS does have presence of an 
intelligence capacity that works closely with its military.188 The IS’s Security and 
Intelligence Council is responsible for eliminating threats to al-Baghdadi, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Joshua Landis, “The battle between ISIS and Syria’s rebel militias,” The Clairon Project, 4 January 
2014, accessed 15 January 2015, http://www.clarionproject.org/research/battle-between-isis-and-syria’s-
rebel-militias.  
187 Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State”, 13. 
188 al-‘Ubaydi et al., “The group that calls itself a state: understanding the evolution and changes of the 
Islamic State,” 18. 
  89	  
maintaining his physical security.189 This council also conducts operations throughout the 
IS’s territory. The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point has indicated that the IS 
has made strides in “designing and developing intelligence practices to assist its military, 
financial and governance activities.”190 However, due to the generally secretive nature of 
intelligence capabilities, little information has been released to the public thus far 
regarding this aspect of the IS’s operations.  
 
 
 The IS’s Intelligence and Security Council ultimately maintains the security, and 
therefore, functionality of the executive, since it allows the Caliph to continue preforming 
his duties as leader. Additionally, this council allows the IS to continue its state making 
actions, because it provides information on rivals that are operating within the IS’s 
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Figure 12: Network Analysis-The Islamic State Intelligence and Security Council 
Source: Zook, Leigh Anne. 2015 
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territory to both the political and military wings. This allows the IS to maintain its 
authority by neutralizing or eliminating these rivals that may threaten its governance.  
The integration between the IS’s intelligence capacity, military and political structure was 
demonstrated in the IS’s attack on Mosul. Prior to the attack, the IS gathered intelligence 
information about the Iraqi security forces’ ability to control Mosul’s periphery through 
repeated attacks on border guards and checkpoints.191 Once again, this demonstrates the 
high level of coordination found within the IS military and political structures.  
As mentioned many times throughout this chapter, the IS’s command of logistics 
to move its manpower and resources is evident. From moving fighters to moving 
weapons, the IS has proven capable of fighting on numerous fronts, and adequately 
allocating resources to these fronts as necessary. For example, a report from Conflict 
Armament Research details weapons and ammunition seized from the IS between mid 
June and early August 2014, noting, “the speed of [weapons] transfer to Ayn al-Arab 
demonstrates the logistical competence of Islamic State forces.”192 Finally, the IS has 
demonstrated that it is also willing to coordinate and negotiate militarily with other 
groups it had previously considered enemies. The IS has established military alliances 
with Sunni factions.193 To some degree, this shows that the IS military is willing to be 
flexible, and also enter into relations with those it sees as important in continuing its 
military objectives.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that it appears the IS is placing considerable effort into 
keeping military records of the type and number of attacks it conducts in different 
provinces. It has published two metrics reports, the first in August 2013, and the second 
Figure 13: Infographic on attack data published in the March 2014 al Naba 
report 
Source: Bilger, Alex. “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military 
Command.” Institute for the Study of War Backgrounder. 22 May 2014. 
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in March 2014, which catalogue data on the attacks conducted in Iraq. The reports, titled 
al Naba (the Report), list 18 different types of attacks and the frequency they were used 
in different areas.194 Although it can be safely assumed that these reports serve as 
propaganda for the IS’s military success, they also demonstrate that the IS is collecting 
detailed reports on where and how it is conducting attacks. Maintaining records on this 
data is important for the IS to evaluate its past successes and failures, and improve their 
means of conducting attacks in the future.   
Through its use of both conventional and insurgency tactics, the IS, in the 
majority of its territory, has secured a monopoly on the use of violence. This tenet of 
statehood is incredibly important in demonstrating who has the authority in a given 
territory, and if this authority can be maintained. The IS’s military is under the command 
of experienced leaders, and has instituted tactics that, given the battlefield situation, have 
generally proven successful and applicable on many fronts. Military operations receive 
support from intelligence and logistical capabilities, and are sustained by recruitment and 
training programs. Like all the IS’s activities, it is generally difficult to discern how 
widely all of these activities are implemented throughout its territory and command 
structure. However, the fact that these ways and means to using and sustaining a military 
force exist, goes great lengths in proving that the IS is a complex organization, and that in 
many respects, it operates in a de facto capacity. Once again, however, the lack of clarity 
regarding the specific amount of control a political entity must possess in order to achieve 
de facto statehood makes it difficult to accurately characterize the IS. However, the IS 
once again does follow the definition of a Class II HSE.  	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CHAPTER 5: FINANCING THE ISLAMIC STATE 
 
The IS, like any organization, requires money to fund its activities. Thus far, it has 
managed to raise enough money, both through legitimate and illegitimate sources, to 
cover its operating costs. Generally, most states generate revenue through legitimate legal 
means, such as investments, loans, bonds and especially taxes. As of June 2014, the IS 
was estimated to have $1.3-2 billion in assets.195 This is more than GDP of several small 
countries, including the Falkland Islands, Tonga, and the Marshall Islands.196 IS has been 
successful in its military campaigns and political activities, in part, due to the vast 
resources it draws from to fund its activities.  
5.1 The Finance Council  
The Finance Council is the overarching authority regarding the IS’s financial 
transactions, and answers to the IS’s central leadership. Although not a great deal is 
known about the Finance Council, it can be safely assumed that the council implements 
directives regarding the IS’s finances, acquisition of resources and payroll of the IS’s 
employees, among other tasks. The existence of a payroll system demonstrates that the IS 
has deemed administration important to its operational success, and is willing to devote 
personnel and resources to assumedly perfecting a historically effective method of 
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understanding the demographics of its fighters and employees. 
 
  
The IS’s administrative capacity in maintaining extensive records of its personnel 
activities and payroll, is highly notable, as this is not a new trend; conversely the IS and 
its predecessor organizations have kept formal records of its employees, employees 
salaries, and employees families and living locations. The Combatting Terrorism Center 
at West Point analyzed 153 declassified managerial and financial documents captured in 
Iraq from 2005-2010, mostly from AQI and the ISI.197 These documents contained 
numerous detailed Microsoft Excel spreadsheets on personnel information and payments 
made to fighters, and therefore highlight the central role played by the organization’s 
administrative personnel.198  Also found in these documents were attempts on behalf of 
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Figure 14:  Network Analysis-Islamic State Finance 
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AQI administrators to attempt to curb possible corruption within the organization, leading 
to charts of statistical calculations.199 These concerns regarding corruption ultimately 
resulted in internal discussions regarding changes in the ISI’s organizational chart in 
2008.200 Although it is impossible to determine if these proposed changes were actually 
implemented, or how similar the IS’s current organizational structure is to the proposed 
changes of its predecessor organizations, it demonstrates the complexity and depth to 
which AQI and the ISI’s financial administration operated. Likewise, the IS today can be 
assumed to operate in a similar, if not more complex, manner. 
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Figure 15: The Islamic State in Iraq’s corruption calculations 
Source: al-‘Ubaydi, Lahoud, Milton and Price. “The group that calls itself a state: 
understanding the evolution and changes of the Islamic State.” December 2014. 
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Maintaining extensive records and a paper trail provides continuity for the IS’s 
operations over time, as changes on the battlefield occur. Additionally, this allows the 
organization to retain core structures and principles, as well as its capability to operate in 
a diminished capacity, even when populations turn against it, as was the case from 2007 
to 2010.201 It would be ignorant to assume that the IS is not keeping similar, if not more 
extensive, records than those it was using when it operated as AQI and the ISI. The 
existence of such records demonstrate that the IS is a complex organization, with high 
levels of administrative and bureaucratic organization which allow it to impose its 
governance and thus accomplish its goals.  
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The existence of a Finance Council rooted in a historical administrative capacity 
is integral for demonstrating that the IS is committed to organizing a multi-faceted 
financial system. Because the IS has implemented such a system in the past as AQI and 
the ISI, it does not need to “reinvent the wheel” so to speak regarding its administrative 
record-keeping, but merely improve what it has built in the past. Furthermore, a focus on 
creating records demonstrates that the IS does not see itself as a temporary organization. 
Establishing records regarding employees’ marital status, number of dependents, location 
of residence, employment type, and salary is incredibly reminiscent of a conventional 
state’s census. Putting effort and resources into collecting and recording demographic 
Figure 17: The Islamic State in Iraq’s proposed changes, and translation 
Source: al-‘Ubaydi, Lahoud, Milton and Price. “The group that calls itself a state: 
understanding the evolution and changes of the Islamic State.” December 2014. 
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information of fighters could be logically expanded to include all of the IS’s employees 
(and not just fighters, for instance), and even populations under the IS’s control in the 
future. Such detailed demographic information is incredibly important from the 
standpoint of a government that is trying to understand the populations under its control 
and likewise how to best allocate resources and services to their population. An 
organization focused on maintaining governance in the long-term would therefore find 
such information necessary for their present and future activities.  
5.2 Expenses  
 Expenses for the IS revolve around two main categories: paying for personnel and 
purchasing items necessary for it to continue operations. Paying personnel includes 
making payments to fighters, paying the salaries of the IS’s administrative employees, 
and paying salaries of local employees. Compensation for fighters includes paying money 
to fighters per month, as well to families if the fighters die in battle.202 Estimates for 
fighters’ salaries range from $200 to $600 per month. Traditionally, the ISI’s payment for 
fighters varies depending on region.203 Furthermore, when the ISI’s payments to fighters 
in 2006-2007 were analyzed, the monetary compensation for fighters was found to be 
much lower than their expected marginal product of labor. Additionally, payments did 
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not reflect the amount of risk fighters might incur by fighting in specific regions.204 
Although this does not appear to be the case today, it is possible that the IS could be 
willing to reduce payments to fighters in the future. Paying the fighters at a lower cost 
could signal the commitment level of fighters.205 That is, fighters that are truly devoted to 
the IS would be willing to accept lower compensation in order to prove their loyalty. This 
could help the IS to screen fighters that could pose problems in the future, and only retain 
fighters truly committed to the cause. Offering a ‘life insurance’ policy of sorts for 
fighters’ families, by paying per child, serves the dual purpose of making up for low 
initial salaries, as well as signal commitment on behalf of the IS to its fighters.206  
Essentially, the IS demonstrates that it values its fighters by showing willingness to spend 
resources on the fighters’ families. At this point, it is not clear if the IS actually follows 
through on making payments to deceased fighters’ families. However, the fact the 
organization has historically been willing to spend less than expected on fighter salaries 
is certainly an important point for considering the IS’s willingness to pay fighters in the 
future, or how much of the IS’s resources are being devoted to fighter payments versus 
other facets of their activities.  
 In addition to paying fighters’ salaries, the IS must also pay for regional 
governors and their respective administrators, as well as national level administrators. 
The amount the IS pays to these individuals is estimated to be between $300 to $2,000, 
and if a form of regional governance exists in each of the IS’s 18 provinces, this totals to 	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a fairly significant amount.207 Furthermore, since these administrators are necessary to 
keep the government functioning, it is unlikely that if future budget cuts were needed, the 
IS would stop regional administrators salaries. It seems more logical to first cut salaries 
of local workers who are not directly employed by the IS administration. For example, 
the IS continues to let workers at the Raqqa dam retain their jobs and assumedly pays the 
workers.208 Willingness to pay salaries of employees, fighters and workers demonstrates 
the IS’s commitment to maintaining jobs necessary to keep the territory they control 
functioning. 
 The other category of the IS’s expenses include purchasing materials necessary to 
continue the IS’s activities, both in military and civilian sectors. This includes buying and 
maintaining military equipment, purchasing building materials for creating, constructing 
and maintaining infrastructure and services, maintaining and fixing key production 
sources (like oil refineries), paying bribes to necessary officials and tribal leaders, and 
funding the IS’s extensive propaganda campaign.209 Thus, the IS’s theoretical 
organization serves as an indicator of de facto sovereignty, as strong organization of 
financial capabilities and record keeping would help to more effectively maintain 
effective control of the populations under the IS’s control. 
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5.3 Revenue 
 The IS employs a number of means to raise funds to pay for its activities. 
Revenue is collected through selling natural resources, “taxing” the population, 
performing kidnappings and collecting outside donations. Since the IS controls the 
commodities and natural resources within its territory, it can decide to sell these resources 
to outside entities. Oil is the largest source of revenue for the IS. The IS produces and 
estimated 50,000 barrels of oil, and is able to sell each barrel of oil for between $18-
60.210 The oil is smuggled to Iran, Kurdistan, Turkey and Syria and is sold to outside 
parties.211  Total oil revenues for the IS can only be estimated at this point, but the 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point reported possible daily revenues for the IS 
range from $720,000 to $16,800,000 per day.212 It is likely that the IS will encounter 
problems in the future maintaining its quantities of oil production, as refineries require 
technical skills to adequately maintain equipment. Through its use of violence, the IS has 
generally driven out the majority of the professional class existing inside of its territory. 
Additionally, the IS’s education system does not include any vocational or technical 
training; so it is unlikely a new professional class will rise with the skills necessary to 
maintain technical equipment.  
 “Taxation” provides another large source of revenue for the IS. In the west this is 
often seen as extortion; however, the IS considers it religious taxation.213 This “taxation” 
takes place in numerous forms. The IS requires payments from neighborhoods whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 al-‘Ubaydi, et al., “The group that calls itself a state: understanding the evolution and changes of the 
Islamic State,” 58. 
211 Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Here’s how ISIS uses oil to fuel its advances,” Business Insider, 18 September 
2014, accessed 10 January 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-how-islamic-state-uses-syrias-oil-to-
fuel-its-advances-2014-9. 
212 al-‘Ubaydi, et al., “The group that calls itself a state: understanding the evolution and changes of the 
Islamic State,” 58. 
213 Ibid, 61. 
  102	  
residents are religious minorities, as well requires payments from various local 
businesses, which it construes as protection payments.214 Additionally, the IS has 
implemented a fairly consistent tariff on trucks and shipments entering and leaving its 
territory.215 This system taxes on trucks at an initial checkpoint, and issues drivers a paper 
receipt that can be used for other checkpoints along their route.216   The presence of a 
taxation system that is applied constantly, as is in the case of the trucks, shows the high 
levels of organization in the IS’s governance. 
 Kidnappings and collecting ransom money have also become a profitable 
enterprise for the IS. The Telegraph estimates that the IS has collected nearly $65 million 
from high-profile kidnappings, such as that of four French hostages in 2014 which may 
have cost $18 million.217 Donations do make up some of the IS’s revenue, but not a 
significant portion. In 2010 alone, donations from the Gulf are only estimated to have 
made up a mere 5% of the IS’s revenue.218 More contributions are actually made from 
donors in Iraq, rather than the Gulf, due to their close proximity to the IS’s territory.219 
No states are known to provide direct funding to the IS.220 
 For the most part, the IS gathers revenue through “illegitimate” means in the eyes 
of the west, such as extortion rackets and selling black-market oil. However it should be 
noted that some legitimate sources of collecting revenue exist. Additionally, the IS seems 
capable of balancing its budget, so to speak, by bringing enough revenue to cover its 	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operational costs. Thus far, the IS’s ability to govern has not been hindered by a lack of 
funding. However, as operational costs increase, and the IS’s ability to maintain it 
sources of revenue decrease, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain this standard.221 
Eventually, it is likely the IS will need to make cuts, which could negatively impact its 
future ability to functionally govern its territory, and therefore, undermine its authority as 
a political structure.  
 So long as the IS is able to cover operational costs, it will more easily be able to 
maintain effective control over its population and territory. The financial longevity in the 
long term is questionable at best, making it difficult to judge the degree to which the IS 
possesses de facto sovereignty. Class II HSE however, takes into account that an entity’s 
effective control may waver and shift over time.   
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CONCLUSION 
In many respects, the IS’s characteristics and actions are very similar to those of 
recognized sovereign states. The IS has an organized political structure, which includes 
administrative capabilities, as well as cognizance for the need of establishing centralized 
and local-level governance throughout its territory. Learning from the shortcomings of its 
precursor organization, AQI, during the Iraq war, the IS has also provided numerous 
services to its population. This focus on providing basic commodities like electricity and 
water, as well as other services, to populations that formerly, under the Iraqi or Syrian 
government did not receive those services gives populations a pragmatic incentive to 
allow the IS’s rule that compliments fears of brutal violence. This commitment to 
services and establishing local-level control over populations under IS control extends to 
military and economic objectives, as the IS includes key infrastructure and resources in 
its military objectives and uses its revenues to fund service projects and pay workers’ 
salaries. Ultimately, the IS demonstrates the presence of numerous types of sovereignty, 
including Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty, as well as the state 
actions of war making and state making. Additionally, the IS also faces similar problems 
as do sovereign states. Although the IS has established short term goals and attempts to, 
for example, provide numerous services, it faces long term challenges in actually 
continuing to supply populations with basic services at current levels, problems with 
managing infrastructure and industry, and creating an educated professional class that is 
actually able to continue the IS’s internal industries. The IS must maintain order within 
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its territory, as well as defend its new borders. Providing adequate compensation for the 
IS’s employees, many of whom are foreign fighters, will become a concern when the IS’s 
revenue dwindles due to mismanagement of key industries, such as oil refineries. Will, in 
the long term, the IS be able to reconcile budgetary constraints, expectant populations, 
flow of goods and services to disparaged populations, a strict and violent judicial and 
legislative system, and strong opposition from foreign superpowers? At the same time, 
the IS must also be recognized and viewed as a legitimate and viable “state” in the 
Islamic discourse. Furthermore, when attempting to evaluate the IS based on general 
definitions of de facto statehood, it is difficult to discern the degree to which external 
sovereignty exists. Another issue is the degree to which the IS must implement 
governance throughout all of its territory. Undoubtedly, the IS has stronger governance in 
different areas of its territory; its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa, for instance, has 
numerous services, whereas populations on the outskirts of the IS’s territorial holdings 
have considerably fewer. Ultimately, it is exceedingly difficult to determine if the IS is 
truly a de facto state, due to the lack of objective and specific criteria that dictates exactly 
how a non-state actor qualifies as a de facto state.  
One of the most difficult problems faced in attempting to accurately characterize 
the IS is the lack of a term which adequately defines the IS. The term “state” itself can 
characterize numerous types of behavior, and seems largely dependent on whether or not 
certain world powers desire recognition, rather than strict adherence to specific criteria. 
The IS does not fit the definitions of a traditional state, according to the Montevideo 
Convention, nor is it a traditional insurgency. The US military’s proposed definition of a 
“hybrid threat” attempts to reconcile threats that encompass both conventional and 
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irregular forces, much like a non-state entity that exhibits both state-like and insurgency 
characteristics. Certainly the idea that entities that embody state-like characteristics and 
more insurgency-type capabilities is dually relevant and useful, but over-generalizing the 
term to the point it does not truly describe the entity in question defeats the purpose. 
Furthermore, the importance of correctly defining these “hybrid” actors has implications 
for US military and diplomatic actions. In his account of his Marine Corps 
reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, LTC Alex Lee describes a situation where one of his 
superiors questions terminology regarding helicopter assaults in an operations study titled 
“MARCOR-85,” 
Was the figure driven by missile threat, air cover necessity, steaming room, etc., 
etc.? There was no answer, and with that parameter placed in a better context, 
everyone could look to the future with more flexibility. Arbitrary numbers must 
never dictate development of doctrine […] words have meanings, and those 
meanings must be applicable to the problem under study. From such mundane 
matters are battles won.222 
As aptly stated by LTC Lee, wars are fought and waged based on word-based definitions. 
Poor definitions have the potential to hinder state interactions with “hybrid” actors that 
are generically characterized or oversimplified. For this reason, using the terminology of 
“Hybrid State Entity,” and its respective three classes, represents a more accurate 
depiction of the practical capabilities of modern non-state actors. 
The IS best fits into the categorization as a Class II Hybrid State Entity. This is 
because the IS exhibits many characteristics of a de facto state, such as having control 
over the majority of its territory and population. It has created an economic system that, 	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in the short term appears to be generating enough revenue to cover expenses. Within the 
IS’s territory, there is little internal military or political opposition, but the IS’s ability to 
project its power to the further expanses of its territory faces difficulty.  Concluding that 
the IS is not a de facto state, and merely a non-state actor, would severely obscure the 
IS’s success in implementing state-like governance across its territory. However, it 
should also be noted that the IS is not able to establish its governance equally across its 
territory. Terming the IS as a Class II Hybrid State Entity allows for the understanding 
that functionally, the IS is able to implement numerous facets of state building, while at 
the same time also failing to meet the criteria of being a sovereign state. 
   Determining an accurate way to define and characterize modern state and non-
state entities has important practical ramifications relating to how these entities and their 
capabilities are perceived. The strength of defining non-state actors as Hybrid State 
Entities lies in recognizing that these entities can perform the same activities and 
demonstrate many of the same characteristics as sovereign states, yet are not recognized 
sovereign states. Terming non-state actors as entities other than states gives the 
connotation that these actors are fundamentally different than states, and therefore, 
cannot behave or operate as states do. As demonstrated by the IS, this is simply not the 
case in modern times. Practically, non-state entities, even extremist militant 
organizations, can behave very pragmatically in trying to secure their goals of territorial 
control. Refusing to acknowledge that the same processes states use to establish and 
maintain governance can likewise be used and embodied by non-state actors discounts 
the real life manifestations of these actors’ actions. When military and diplomatic 
interactions come into play, as they usually do, developing strategies on how to deal with 
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these non-state actors should be based on practical actions, rather than generalizations 
indicated by poor definitions. Additionally, acknowledging that non-state actors may, in 
fact, more closely resemble sovereign states allows for acknowledgement that non-state 
actors can successful operate in numerous categories outside of military capabilities, such 
as in politics and economics.  
 Understanding the multi-faceted nature of non-state actors is important for 
learning how to successfully interact with them, militarily and diplomatically. In the case 
of the IS, better conceptions of what the IS truly is and how it operates yields the 
observation that it is highly unlikely a bombing campaign, and no other means of attack, 
will completely destroy the IS. A strong and detailed organizational structure exists, 
which cannot be easily destroyed by bombing campaigns alone. Furthermore, the 
situation in which the IS was able to come to power in the territories it controls (that is, 
filling the power vacuum left by poor governance in Iraq and Syria), will not be solved 
by bombing or even removing, the IS. Finally, if the IS is able to cement its governance, 
and facilitate successful integration of local populations into the IS’s employment and 
military structures, the lines between unwilling civilians coerced into the IS’s service and 
military combatants begins to quickly blur. Given US President Obama’s request to the 
US Congress on 11 February 2015 for the formal use of force against the IS,223 fully 
conceptualizing the IS’s capabilities across multiple spectrums is of the upmost 
importance for the US in developing an effective strategy on how to interact with the IS.  
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AQI  Al Qaeda in Iraq 
 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
 
HSE  Hybrid State Entity 
 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
 
IS  Islamic State 
 
ISI  Islamic State in Iraq 
 
ISIL  Islamic State in Syria and the Levant 
 
ISIS  Islamic State in the Sham 
 
IW  Irregular Warfare 
 
LTC  Lieutenant Colonel 
 
RPG  Rocket Propelled Grenade  
 
TW  Traditional Warfare 
 
UN  The United Nations 
 
US  The United States of America 
 
VBIED Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device 
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APPENDIX B: NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE	  
 
 
 
 An online version of the visual network analysis of the Islamic State is found 
on the University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies website 
at: http://www.ciss-space.com/ISNA.224   
 
 
 In the author’s experience researching an accurate depiction of how the IS is 
functionally organized and operates on a daily basis, it quickly became apparent that a 
comprehensive chart accurately depicting the IS was lacking among existing scholarship. 
For this reason, the author combined information from numerous reports and existing 
charts into one holistic network analysis using Semantica Professional 5.5 software. Due 
to the ongoing and tenuous nature of the events surrounding the IS (i.e. the death of key 
leaders and individuals, organizational structure changes, difficulty of checking reported 
information against events actually occurring on the ground, etc.), this chart does not 
attempt to maintain complete accuracy of the IS’s organizational structure. Rather, this 
chart’s goal is to serve as a depiction to the reader as to the general and theoretical 
organizational structure of the IS. Furthermore, the author’s intent for this chart is to 
serve as a baseline framework for adding additional details, individuals, locations, etc., as 
the IS continues to evolve, in order to provide the most accurate picture of the 
organization and its practical capabilities presently and in the future.   
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